Sovereign Debt Crises: Domestically Engineered or Foreignly Influenced? by Selfe, Michael C.
Trinity College
Trinity College Digital Repository
Senior Theses and Projects Student Works
Spring 2017
Sovereign Debt Crises: Domestically Engineered
or Foreignly Influenced?
Michael C. Selfe
Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut, michael.selfe@trincoll.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses
Part of the International Economics Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons
Recommended Citation
Selfe, Michael C., "Sovereign Debt Crises: Domestically Engineered or Foreignly Influenced?". Senior Theses, Trinity College,
Hartford, CT 2017.
Trinity College Digital Repository, http://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/theses/632
1 
 
 
Abstract  
Throughout the last half century, the world has seen its fair share of systemic banking crises covering 
every corner of the globe. Recently, the Eurozone crisis of 2010 and ongoing Argentinian debt crisis have 
continued to plague the global economy. The motivation behind this thesis is to examine what causes 
these sovereign debt crises. More specifically, it aims to examine whether these crises are caused by 
monetary and fiscal policy decisions implemented by central banks or if outside factors including the role 
of financial institutions are to blame. This thesis examines a number of individual case studies with 
regards to specific economic indicators and aims to see if there is any relationship between the nations 
being examined. Specifically, these case studies include the East Asia crisis of 1997, the Argentinian debt 
crisis of 2001, and the Eurozone crisis of 2010. It will examine individual nations in the years leading up 
to the crisis, the years in which the crisis took place, and the aftermath of the crisis.  
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Introduction 
Sovereign Debt Crises are one of the most prevalent yet puzzling financial issues that have come 
to impact the global economy over the last half century. The impact of these crises are felt 
throughout all corners and regions of the globe. What is interesting about them is that even 
though there have been numerous different case studies, domestic and institutional economic 
policymakers are unsure how to best respond. Most recently, the Eurozone crisis of 2010 that 
continues today has led to widespread financial contagion across the continent. With no clear end 
in sight, high levels of unemployment, and stagnant GDP growth across many of the nations in 
the Eurozone, policymakers remain conflicted on how to best respond. Although the troika, the 
three-part commission composed of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund, have created a 750 billion euro war chest to provide loans and 
emergency bailout cash to the affected nations, many economists argue that they have further 
compounded and accelerated the crisis in a number of the nations. Although the IMF has 
witnessed these crises before, they have done little to help provide effective solutions and advice 
to the leaders of the ECB. To many economists and policymakers, it almost feels as if the blind 
are leading the blind. 
What is interesting about these crises is that although they continue to take place, there is no 
clear understanding of what causes them. Although there are similarities in the domestic 
economies of the nations leading up to them, there are also clear fundamental differences. For 
example, when looking at the cases of Argentina and Greece, they were both classified as 
sovereign debt crises. However, Argentina had its currency pegged to the U.S. dollar and a 
strong export sector, while Greece had adopted a common currency and experienced steady GDP 
growth in the years leading up to the crash of its economy. This serves as the main motivation 
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for this thesis; what causes sovereign debt crises. More specifically, are these crises caused by 
the policy decisions of nations’ central banks and monetary unions or are foreign actors such as 
the International Monetary Fund, external debt holders, and large banks to blame. 
To understand the background of these crises and the differing views on what causes and 
accelerates them, a complete review of the literature pertaining to the topic was undertaken. 
There are two main schools of thought that emerge. The first being that these crises were the 
result of underlying structural issues in the domestic economy. For example, in the case of the 
Eurozone crisis, much of the blame is placed on the implementation of the euro as a common 
currency and the underlying weaknesses in each nation’s labor market. The second school of 
thought is that these crises are the result of foreign financial institutions who held large amounts 
of debt and through speculation and influence led the economies of these nations into turmoil. 
With that being said, by the conclusion of this thesis it becomes clear that while foreign financial 
institutions played key roles in advancing these crises, they were not the fundamental underlying 
cause of them. 
To examine these crises, a case study approach is utilized by examining common variables in 
each of the nations including: debt to GDP ratios, GDP growth, unemployment, levels of 
external debt, and 10-year government bond yields. This was done to examine the economic 
health of the nations in the years leading up, during,  and following the crises. What proves to be 
important following this study is what policies the governments of each nation chose to 
implement in order to provide some sense of financial stability. This leads to an important 
question and one of the fundamental reasons why this thesis topic was chosen as a course of 
study; is there any relation between past sovereign debt crises and the ongoing one in the 
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Eurozone? If so, why haven’t policymakers drawn on prior mistakes and implemented more 
successful measures in limiting and providing support to these struggling nations. 
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Chapter 1: Theory Review 
1.1 New Institutional Theories of Finance  
New Institutional Theories of Finance fall within a class of models known as New Keynesian 
models. They refer to a broad group of models focusing on the investigation of macroeconomic 
effects of imperfect competition and market failure. They particularly focus on how market 
failure can amplify small exogenous shocks into large business cycles. These new models that 
are put forward share the uniform goal of developing increasingly rigorous models with better 
microeconomic foundations. By adding a clear microeconomic foundation, we are able to see 
that in these New Keynesian theories, market failure occurs as a result of firms and households 
engaging in optimizing behavior (Knoop, 2008).  
The New Institutional Theories of Finance place an emphasis on first studying the 
microeconomic behavior of banks, financial markets, firms and households before moving on to 
examine the implications they have at the macroeconomic level. Previously, the Keynesian and 
New Classical models have ignored the complexities of the interactions at the firm level. The 
reason being that these models assumed uniform representative agents on the macro and micro 
levels, leading to interactions between individuals in the financial system being ignored. In other 
words, by focusing on heterogeneity and microlevel financial fundamentals, these theories 
provide deeper insight into the process of financial intermediation and the overall 
macroeconomic impact it has (Knoop, 2008).  
With that being said, the New Institutional Theories of Finance rely heavily on Irving Fisher’s 
Debt-Deflation theory (1933) and focus on the process of macroeconomic impact and financial 
intermediation. The theory is summarized by the belief that the combination of high levels of 
debt and falling prices lead a nation’s economy on a downward spiral. The theory itself assumes 
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that a country must hold vast amounts of debt and this debt must sound the alarm of either 
debtors or creditors. Once the alarm bells go off and the first domino falls through debt 
liquidation and distressed selling of assets, the spiral has begun. The end result is a reduction in 
output, trade and employment of labor followed by a loss of confidence and, finally, hoarding 
and slowing down the velocity and circulation of money (Fisher, 1933). 
Another key idea related to the New Institutional Theories of Finance is that when examining 
financial activity, the primary focus should be placed on the provision of credit and not just on 
the total amount of liquidity or the money supply. Liquidity refers to the total amount of funds 
available to the lenders (this includes all financial institutions and the financial system as a 
whole). When a change in liquidity occurs, it has taken place because there has been a change in 
the funds available to lenders (in other words; it is measured by the money supply). On the other 
hand, credit refers to the total amount of loanable funds that either an institution or the system as 
a whole is willing to provide. This makes it harder to measure as it is based on both total 
liquidity and the willingness for an institution to make a loan. A final important distinction 
between the two is the idea of perceived default risk and the role it plays in determining credit. 
Perceived default risk can change following many things including: a change in the expected 
future performance of the macroeconomy and a change in the financial position of the lender. 
The evaluation of risk is a complex process that is subject to a great deal of volatility (Knoop, 
2008).  
The New Institutional Theories of Finance also place heavy emphasis on the belief that the 
reason that financial transactions are imperfectly competitive is because financial information is 
imperfect. Imperfect, or asymmetric, information refers to the idea that borrowers always have 
better information about their credit worthiness than lenders. If a borrower is able to convince the 
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lender they are unlikely to default, the loan will be made. On the other hand, if the borrower 
cannot do this, then credit will be denied (Knoop, 2008).  
It is important to highlight the idea that imperfect information distorts the incentives that both 
lenders and borrowers face when making a transaction, leading to an increase in default risk in 
two important ways. The first problem is referred to as adverse selection. This is described by the 
idea that borrowers that have a higher chance of defaulting are more likely to search for loans 
because they want to take with risks with others’ funds as well as their own. On the other hand, 
conservative borrowers are less likely to suffer a loss, and are less likely to need a loan (Knoop, 
2008).  
The second issue is known as moral hazard.  The concept is that the borrower may not use the 
funds as intended or may choose to be unnecessarily risky with it. In other words, the lender 
assumes some of the downside risk of the projects the borrower undertakes, but does not receive 
any of the upside benefit if the project proves to be successful. Moral hazard is one of the 
fundamental and obvious problems in finance due to the fact that most financial institutions act 
as both borrowers and lenders. 
The two problems outlined above are important factors in determining the supply of credit. 
These problems lead to poorer quality of information available to the borrower. The result of this 
is smaller firms are at a major disadvantage because they may have not had the time to establish 
a credit history and, thus, are unable to provide the necessary amounts of financial information to 
lenders (this of course leads to them receiving less credit on costlier terms) (Knoop, 2008).  
The final key idea that the New Institutional Theories of Finance put forward is the thought that 
there is no mechanism that ensures the supply of credit is equal to the demand of credit. The 
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result of this is that the credit market is almost always in disequilibrium. As discussed above, the 
supply of credit is not determined by interest, but, instead, relies on moral hazard and adverse 
selection (risk perceptions) (Knoop, 2008).  
The two main models that are produced because of the four key ideas discussed above are: The 
Financial Accelerator Model and the Credit Rationing Model. However, only the Financial 
Accelerator Model proves to be valuable for this thesis and will be analyzed and discussed in 
detail.  
1.2 The Financial Accelerator Model  
The financial accelerator model was first examined by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist in their 
article on the topic titled, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality (1996). The model 
itself examines how asymmetric information due to imperfection in the financial market further 
aggravates a financial or economic downturn. In their seminal paper, Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist argue that the cost of credit intermediation of individuals, households and firms affect 
the overall level of credit within a specific economy. As a result, initial small demand shocks to 
the economic environment can lead to unforeseen and larger downturns within the economy 
itself (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).  
The three further argue that the cost of credit intermediation is partly related to interest rates. 
Credit intermediation refers to the core banking function of taking money from savers and 
lending it to borrowers. It is important to note that the model holds three key assumptions 
relating to costs. The first two being that access to financial information and the cost of 
providing information are both very costly. The final assumption is that borrowers also take on 
both monitoring costs and opportunity cost of collateral in some cases. For example, when 
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looking at the case of a borrower’s monitoring costs, one might refer to the fact that they must 
provide additional information to a lender over the life of a loan. The cost of collateral usually 
comes in the form of significant underwriting fees, if bond or stock is issued, that borrowers pay 
when these securities are sold to the public (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).  
The result of this varies for both firms and individual economies. In the case of this thesis, what 
is most important is the idea that firms’ actions within these individual economies lead to the 
acceleration of the problems previously outlined. With that being said, the previously established 
costs associated with credit will lead to firms seeking to finance their projects internally as 
oppose to externally. The reason for this being that external finance is more expensive than 
internal finance, with the only exception being when the external finance is fully collateralized. It 
is important to note that external finance refers to the idea of going out to the capital markets to 
either raise equity or issue debt. On the other hand, internal finance refers to financing projects 
internally through retained earnings (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).  
It is important to note that raising equity in a secondary offering has serious consequences since 
it not only dilutes ownership, but also may send signals to the public that the stock of the firm is 
overvalued. On the other hand, although issuing debt may be cheaper because of the potential 
tax-shield being offered, it also has many disadvantages associated with it. One of these key risks 
is that it increases the company’s risk level, making it increasingly sensitive to economic 
downturns, interest rate variability, and changing market conditions (Knoop, 2008).  
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist argue that the cost of credit intermediation falls on both the 
borrowers and lenders and that it does not necessarily depend on debt levels, as long as, the 
borrowers have assets that can be collateralized. This is better understood by the idea that 
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borrowers net worth is what the creditors look at (net worth = total assets – total liabilities) 
(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).  
 
To best understand this model at work, we must first assume that the economy is in an economic 
downturn or recession, which in-turn has led to a decrease in the profitability of the firm or a 
reduction of wealth in affected households. It can be assumed that because the overall net worth 
of the firm has decreased, lenders will be reluctant to provide the firm with credit, resulting in 
the cost of credit for the firm to increase. The firm is now not able to access credit in the same 
manor it had before, leading to a decrease in investment and consumption of firms. If this cycle 
continues throughout many firms in the economy, the downturn or recession will worsen 
overtime (Knoop, 2008).  
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From examining the Economic Model in Fig 1.1 we have again assumed that a recession has 
occurred.  We see that the aggregate demand has shifted downwards from AD1 to AD2 due to a 
sudden decrease in the money supply, a decline in expectations, and an overall increase in 
perceived risk associated with the economy. A similar situation, in which the AD shifts 
downward, can also take place if both a housing bubble is present and following the burst of the 
bubble, when prices decline dramatically. These four shocks coupled with the higher cost of 
credit intermediation are responsible for the shift of the curve. It is important to also examine the 
impact on the aggregate supply curve, which shifts upwards to the left. This shift from AS1 to 
AS2 can be explained by the higher risk factor, along with the overall decrease in capacity as a 
result of the fall in investment. The result of these two shifts is the equilibrium output shifting 
from YNR to Y3. This will be further examined in the case study section of the thesis when 
looking at the individual case of Portugal and the nation’s response to the sovereign debt crisis it 
faced (Knoop, 2008).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature surrounding the topic of what causes systemic banking crises in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia is both complete and thorough. The economists that examine this complex 
macroeconomic topic develop a number of differing theories using a wide range of data and 
cases to support their claims. With that being said, because there is so much literature 
surrounding the topic, we must identify what is important to the research pertaining to the topic 
at hand: whether or not these sovereign debt crises are caused by monetary or fiscal policy 
decisions put in place by central banks or if other outside impacts such as financial institutions 
played major roles. These financial institutions include the International Monetary Fund, large 
public and private commercial banks, hedge funds, and large sovereign wealth money managers. 
This review will examine the literature that pertains to the east Asian crisis of 1997 and 1998, the 
Argentinian crisis of 2001, and the Eurozone crisis of 2010 that has continued to this day. 
Additionally, there will be a focused placed on analyzing the data that is prevalent to these crises 
and the state of the economies leading up to the individual crisis both during and after the crisis. 
It is important to note that, although it is prevalent to understanding how financial crises unfold, 
the Great Recession of 2008 will not be thoroughly examined as it is not considered to be a debt 
crisis per se and because it was individual institutions and their actions that brought down the 
United States’ economy rather than the country itself being unable to service its debt. However, 
it will be important when looking at the role that it had on the Eurozone, the impact that it had on 
the development of the debt crisis in the region, and its ensuing recovery efforts.  
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As previously mentioned, the viewpoints and beliefs surrounding these crises vary among 
economists and policymakers. Many place a heavy emphasis on the role of policies put in place 
by central banks and monetary unions, while others believe that external shocks through the role 
of various financial institutions are to blame. Within each of the regions being examined and the 
individual case studies, themes tend to vary, however, some underlying ideas remain constant 
including: the role of central banks and government institutions and the financial consequences 
following the initial crisis. 
2.2 Theories and Causes 
One of the most important economic theories with regards to the causes of systemic banking 
crises is the financial accelerator model. The financial accelerator is best examined in two key 
pieces of literature; Todd Knoop’s, Modern Financial Macroeconomics: Panics, Crashes and 
Crises (2008) and Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist’s article, The Financial 
Accelerator and the Flight to Quality (1996), which is the seminal piece on the topic. The 
accelerator model argues that following an adverse macroeconomic shock, borrowers will not 
have the ability to access high amounts of credit and, as a result, their overall economic activity 
will decline. These macroeconomic shocks include a sudden decrease in the money supply, a 
decline in expectations, an overall increase in perceived risk associated with the economy, or a 
bubble in housing prices that has burst. The model itself falls under the umbrella of the New 
Institutional Theories of Finance, which aim to offer solutions to some of the problems 
associated with the Keynesian and New Classical models.   
Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff offer a valuable opinion regarding the theoretical 
underpinnings of debt crises and place heavy blame on the lack of a super national legal 
framework for enforcing debt contracts across borders. A way of understanding this is if a 
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country borrows money from a foreign bank and then defaults, the bank’s options for direct 
enforcement of its claims on the assets are limited. An example of this lack of regulation was 
seen in the case of the Argentinian debt crisis of 2001, which will be discussed in further detail 
when examining the region of Latin America (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
With regards to sovereign lending, the question that is posed is what can foreign creditors 
actually hold over sovereign borrowers? This question was first put forward by Jonathan Eaton 
and Mark Gersovitz in their seminal paper on the topic, Debt With Potential Repudiation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (1981). The two argue that governments must worry about 
their reputation as borrowers and that any reneging on their previously owed debt may hurt their 
reputation, thus undermining their future credibility. The result being that governments will try 
and uphold their reputation so they can borrow even more in the future. With that being said, this 
reputational approach may be viewed as somewhat simplistic in today’s lending markets along 
with global political and security arrangements between nations (Eaton & Gersovitz, 1981). 
Partial default and rescheduling of debt is also an important underpinning behind sovereign debt 
crises. It is important to note that most defaults end up being partial as creditors may not have the 
leverage to enforce full repayment. One of the key players in these partial repayment 
negotiations are international lending institutions such as the IMF. These third-party 
organizations may be gamed into making side payments to facilitate a deal through dealings with 
governments and creditors. Reinhart and Rogoff argue that following the development of these 
organizations after WWII there have been shorter but more frequent episodes of sovereign debt 
crises because both lenders and borrowers are able to rely on subsidies from the IMF, along with 
governments of creditor countries. This is a fundamentally important point for understanding the 
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role that financial institutions play in these crises and why many economists place a substantial 
amount of blame on the decisions they choose to undertake (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
The correlation between sovereign debt crises and other financial crises is critical in 
understanding the underlying causes that make a country more likely to default on their debt. 
This is especially the case in emerging markets where global financial turbulence can lead to 
harsher consequences. A key reason for this is the idea that weakening global growth can lead to 
declining commodity markets, thus reducing the export earnings of primary commodity 
producers. From Fig. 2.1, we are able to see the proportion of countries with banking and 
external debt crises. The graph itself plots the share of countries experiencing a banking crisis  
against the comparably calculated share of countries experiencing a default or restructuring in 
their external debt. It is important to note that from the graph we see a spike in banking crises 
following 1977. In the period leading up to this, it can be said that one of the reasons why there 
was a decline in crises was because of more intense supervision on financial institutions. This 
was highlighted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980. The DIDMCA hoped to increase the role of banks within the financial 
markets while also improving the control of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. To do this, 
they aimed to phase out restrictions on interest rates that depository institutions could offer to 
their clients on the deposits they made. Furthermore, it was now required that all institutions that 
accepted deposits had to meet reserve requirements (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
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Fig 2.1: Proportion of countries with banking and external debt crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) 
Another interesting correlation that deserves attention is the relation between default and 
inflation. It is important to note that periods of inflation are also likely to be compounded during 
times follow external default. As nations are shut out of international capital markets and face 
declining revenues, they are sometimes forced to put in place the dreaded inflation tax (a cost or 
penalty that people are forced to pay when they hold cash at a time of high inflation). From Fig. 
2.2, we are further able to see the correlation when looking at shares of countries with inflation 
above 20 percent and shares of countries that experience external default. The causation of this is 
when countries default, whether it be for debt or other related reasons, their currency declines in 
value and, thus, inflation rises to extremely high levels (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
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Fig 2.2 Inflation crises and external default. (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009) 
An important theory that relates to the potential path that Europe may continue down is the debt-
deflation theory coined by Irving Fisher in 1933. The theory puts forward the notion that if a 
state is in a position of great indebtedness, a series of adverse events will unfold that will further 
impact the economy and lead to a mass liquidation through wide spread panic by debtors or 
creditors. Fisher believes that recessions and depressions in an economy are the result of rising 
real debt burdens stemming from deflation, leading consumers to default on loans they 
previously had taken. This theory put forth by Fisher is further examined in the theory review of 
the thesis. However, it is important to point out its significance when examining the potential 
scenarios that may unfold in Europe. Although this theory may not be of significance to the 
causes of the crises being examined because of its relation to consumer loans, it is important in 
understanding the potential situation in Europe that may unfold if economic activity continues to 
decline (Fisher, 1933).  
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2.3 Crises Characteristics 
Manasse and Roubini also offer some crucial literature pertaining to the idea that global 
economic factors play a major role in precipitating sovereign debt crises. Their paper ‘Rule of 
Thumb’ for Sovereign Debt Crises (2005), provides an empirical investigation of the set of 
economic and political conditions that are associated with a sovereign debt crisis taking place. 
By utilizing a number of predictor variables including: total external debt, short-term external 
debt, inflation and public external debt to revenue, countries are classified into three types of 
crises: i) episodes of insolvency; ii) episodes of illiquidity; and iii) episodes of macro and 
exchange rate weakness (Manasse & Roubini, 2005). 
Reinhart and Rogoff also provide insight into the duration of each default episode. As previously 
mentioned, following WWII the time countries were in these crises declined from six to three 
years. Although the more charitable interpretation of this is the idea that crisis resolution 
mechanisms have improved, many economists argue that this is not the case. Instead, the 
opposing school of thought believes that because bailouts are facilitated by lending institutions, 
creditors are willing to provide lenient payment demands to defaulting borrowers (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009). 
While examining the aftermath of the crises in each region, it is important to understand what 
common characteristics each of them share. The seminal piece on this topic is also put forward 
by Reinhart and Rogoff. It discusses the similarities in a number of financial crises in developing 
and developed economies, something that previously had not been done. In their article, The 
Aftermath of Financial Crises (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff examine specific characteristics that 
are experienced by developed and emerging markets following financial crises. These 
characteristics include: housing prices, equity prices, unemployment rate, real GDP, and debt 
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levels. They argue that severe financial crises share three common characteristics: asset market 
collapses that are deep and prolonged, profound declines in output and unemployment, and a 
rapid increase in the real value of government debt. This proves to be valuable in helping 
understand what common patterns exist between these crises specifically with regards to several 
famous emerging market cases that will be examined, including the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 
and the Argentinian crisis of 2001 (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Reinhart and Rogoff examine several interesting pieces of data when discussing the collapse of 
asset markets. They choose to analyze the declines in real house price cycles and real equity 
price cycles from their peak-to-trough by looking at the duration in years. However, what proves 
to be of importance for the topic being examined is their study of the cumulative increase in real 
public debt in the three years following the start of a banking crisis. This is shown in Figure 2.3, 
where the cumulative increase in public debt over a three-year period follows the onset of a 
banking crisis in a number of developing economies (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
 
Fig 2.3: Cumulative Increase in Public Debt in the Three Years Following the Banking Crisis. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) 
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This buildup of government debt proves to be a defining characteristic of the aftermath following 
financial crises. When examining these stylized facts, it is important to understand what some of 
the key reasons are for these sharp rises in debt. Some of the drivers of this include sharp falloffs 
in tax revenue along with surges in government spending to fight the recession. It is important to 
note that bank bailout costs prove to be only a relatively minor contributor to the increase in 
public debt (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Although the piece is helpful in providing an overall summary of many of the individual cases 
being examined in the thesis, the authors do not look at the specific data points that relate to the 
European debt crisis of 2010. While they provide a clear picture of some of the similar traits 
shared by developing and emerging countries throughout all stages of banking crises, they fail to 
examine the sovereign debt crises most of these countries are exposed to prior to the collapse of 
the banking system (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
Weisbrot also offers a complete and thorough study of the aftermath of financial crises with a 
particular focus placed on the Eurozone crisis and Argentinian crisis of 2001. He acknowledges 
the ideas brought forward by Reinhart and Rogoff and agrees with them in the context that slow 
recovery and prolonged unemployment is an inevitable result of recessions brought about by 
financial crises. However, he believes that this pattern has more to do with governments pursuing 
the wrong policies in the aftermath of crisis and less to do with a clear correlation. Weisbrot 
points to the case of Argentina following its severe financial crisis of 2001-2002. This individual 
case study will be studied more in-depth throughout the thesis as it serves as a much needed 
example of economic recovery and progressive policy making (Weisbrot, 2009).  
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2.4 European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
When examining the crisis that has developed throughout the Eurozone, one of the most 
important pieces of literature on the topic is put forth by Joseph Stiglitz and is titled The Euro: 
How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe (2016). Stiglitz brings forth the 
argument that although there were many issues that contributed to Europe’s problems, the 
underlying mistake that led to the crisis in the region was the adoption of the euro. More 
specifically, he believes that by adopting a uniform currency in the region before even creating a 
set of institutions that allowed Europe to function effectively, economic turmoil was inevitable 
(Stiglitz, 2016). 
Stiglitz places an emphasis on the idea of why well-intentioned statesmen and politicians in the 
region created something that had the opposite effect. He believes the reason for this is that the 
euro itself was primarily a political project and not strong enough to create the economic and 
institutional conditions necessary to allow the currency to succeed. He also examines the key 
economic indicators of the crisis in comparison with the Great Depression. As previously 
mentioned, the thesis itself will not place a heavy focus on the Great Depression nor the Great 
Recession, as they were not sovereign debt crises; however, having this data proves to be 
important when analyzing each individual case study, as it serves as a baseline for the research. 
From the graph below we can see eleven members of the Eurozone and the Real GDP 
contractions from both the current Euro crisis and the Great Depression. These nations being 
examined in the thesis and shown in the graph have experienced greater GDP contractions during 
the eight-year period than in the Great Depression, with the exception of Spain (Stiglitz, 2016). 
 
26 
 
Another important piece of data that Stiglitz puts forward that proves to be helpful in supporting 
the argument that the Euro crisis was caused by the role of institutions is his comparison of the 
Real GDP per capita growth during the period of 2007-2015 in the United States, the European 
Union, and non-Eurozone Europe. He uses specific data to support this argument and states that 
non-Eurozone countries had a GDP of 8.1% higher in comparison to the 0.6% percent increase 
within the Eurozone (Stiglitz, 2016).  
In his article, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2012), Philip Lane puts forth the argument 
that the euro aimed to address the problem of over-borrowing in the region along with the free-
rider problem in two ways. The first being through the stability and growth pact which aimed to 
limit the size of annual budget deficits at 3 percent of GDP and the stock of public debt of 60 
percent of GDP. The second was to make sure no country was bailed out, with the implication 
that a sovereign default would occur if a national government failed to meet the debt obligations 
as stated above. However, Lane is quick to point to the fact that, even before the euro was 
implemented, the public debt to GDP ratio was 70 percent for the set of countries that would 
later form the Eurozone (Lane, 2012). This relationship is shown on the figure below:  
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Fig 2.4: The Evolution of Public Debt, 1982-2011. (Lane, 2012) 
Another critical factor that Lane believes policy makers failed to take into account when 
implementing the euro were the financial and external imbalances that plagued much of the 
region. After adopting the euro, many of the countries experienced large credit booms in 
anticipation of becoming members of the Eurozone. The reason for these credit booms was, in 
part, by joining the Eurozone the domestic banks within these nations could raise funds from 
international sources by using the euro rather than borrowing in a currency that wasn’t their own 
with the hope that exchange rates wouldn’t move against them. The other issue, as mentioned 
above, was the dispersion and persistence of current account imbalances within the region. These 
imbalances carry with them both short-term and medium-term growth implications. In the short-
term, if there is a sudden stop in funding markets and a reversal of capital flows, there are 
immediate output contractions, rises in unemployment, and declines in asset prices. In the 
medium-term, an imbalance can be harmful if a rise in expenditure on non-tradeable goods 
squeezes the tradeable sector through higher wages and resources being shifted away from 
industries with higher growth prospects. This is somewhat similar to the Balassa-Samuelson 
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effect, which argues that an increase and wages in the tradeable goods sector of an emerging 
economy will, in turn, lead to an increase in wages in the non-tradeable sector (Lane, 2012). 
It is important to note that Lane believes that the debt crisis was accelerated by the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. He argues that from 2008-2009 there was relatively little concern 
about European sovereign debt. However, as the crisis made its way across the Atlantic, cross-
border financial flows began to dry up and countries, such as Ireland, that relied heavily on 
external funding (short term debt markets), were greatly affected. Other countries who were non-
members of the Eurozone, such as Iceland, were also impacted. However, he argues the first 
event that really raised eyebrows was in October of 2009 when the newly elected Greek 
government announced a revised budget deficit of 12.7 percent of GDP, more than double the 
previous estimate of 6 percent. The result of this was rising spreads on sovereign bonds. From 
the graph below we are able to see the behavior of ten-year bond yields for the PIIGS nations 
along with France and Germany (Lane, 2012).  
 
Fig 2.5: Yields on Ten-Year Sovereign Bonds, October 2009 to June 2012. (Lane, 2012) 
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From the graph, we are able to see that Greek yields began to diverge in early 2010, the 
relationship between the movement of Irish and Portuguese yields, and the relationship between 
the movement of Italian and Spanish yields. This relationship refers to the similar movements 
that the yields make in the period leading up to the crisis and during the crisis. These 
relationships will be critical when examining each individual case study. 
When examining the programs put in place by the Troika (the triumvirate of the IMF, European 
Central Bank and the European Commission) the reception is met with criticism. The key 
principle being disagreed with is the idea that the conditionally imposed on these nations does 
not focus on loan repayment and is instead being directed, through threats and persuasion, by 
finance ministers of other Eurozone countries (specifically, Germany). The result of this an 
increase in debt, inequality and unemployment. (Stiglitz, 2016). 
The two critical components of these programs are austerity and structural reforms. Austerity 
refers to the idea that a cutback in expenditure would lower the deficit. This strategy was most 
famously used by Herbert Hoover during the stock market crash of 1929 and has been used again 
in the cases of Argentina and East Asia (all of which failed). Stiglitz is blunt about his opinion of 
these policies and says that the greater the austerity, the greater the economic contraction will be. 
The structural reforms put in place by the Troika aimed to both lower wages and prices and 
restructure the individual countries in an effort to make them more efficient. Stiglitz believes 
that, although these reforms did lead to lower wages, they failed to accomplish their goal of 
lowering prices for exports (Stiglitz, 2016).  
Stiglitz does offer some remarks on how to save the euro, but is quick to point out that this 
shouldn’t be done at any costs. The first idea relates to the complete overhaul of the Eurozone’s 
structure through a number of different reforms. These reforms include the implementation of a 
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common banking system (also referred to as a banking union), the mutualization of debt, a 
common framework for stability and a true convergence strategy. These potential policy 
measures will be examined in detail in the policy and discussion chapter. Overall, he believes 
that through structural reforms Europe should strive for full employment and growth for the 
entire region. These structural reforms are most necessary for the long-run success of the 
Eurozone, but only if they are coupled with reforms that also relate to the crisis policies that the 
Troika originally tried to utilize. A specific focus should be placed on utilizing fiscal policy 
while also working towards restructuring individual nations debt (Stiglitz, 2016). 
This idea of counter-productive policies put in place by the troika is shared by a number of other 
economies as well. Mark Weisbrot further builds on this belief that, although the crisis in Europe 
was a result of the adoption of a common currency, it was further magnified by the procyclical 
actions of the troika. Although the crisis has been labeled as a debt crisis by the media and 
international financial institutions, Weisbrot believes that the use of that term is highly 
inaccurate. Instead, he shares a similar belief with Stiglitz that the crisis itself was fundamentally 
caused and deepened by bad policy measures put in place. When Greece first entered 
negotiations with the IMF and ECB in May 2010, the nation had a debt of 130% of GDP. 
Seventeen months later, following the introduction of the suggested policies, the nation’s debt 
had increased to 170% of GDP. It can be argued that this idea of pro-cyclical macroeconomic 
policy (shrinking the economy when it was already weak or in a recession) had no place in the 
Eurozone in 2010 (Weisbrot, 2015).  
The case against financial institutions and the ECB is further pursued by Weisbrot who argues 
that the organizations allowed the region to slip to the edge of a financial meltdown to force the 
weaker Eurozone nations into making larger concessions. This idea of walking on thin-ice or 
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participating in a game of brinkmanship caused repeated crises in Europe, with the most notable 
one taking place in September of 2011 when the IMF refused to release an 8-billion-euro 
installment on a loan to Greece unless the Greek government implemented further budget 
tightening. What Weisbrot finds most shocking is the fact that the European officials in charge 
were willing to put the entire economy at risk for a relatively small amount of money (it was a 
tiny fraction of the hundreds of billions that they had saved up to prevent financial contagion). 
One of the popular and most prevalent theories of why they chose to do this is the belief that they 
wanted to make Greece an example for other nations in the region (Weisbrot, 2015).   
It is important to note that although many of the authors briefly examine the institutions that 
came to define the region, they do not provide a detailed history of the euro itself nor do they 
provide a detailed description of the regions institutions including the European Monetary Union 
and the European Union. For example, Stiglitz states that he is more interested in the outcomes 
of the history of how the institutions came to shape the crisis. In other words, how did the 
European Union transition from strictly a political union into an economic one with its own 
currency? This proves to be important for my research as it allows for the examination of the role 
of these institutions in each individual country being examined. 
In the case of Greece, their debt situation was transformed from something that could have been 
resolved relatively simply and with few resources into a contagious mess that affected the whole 
region. This case of contagion is best described as one that was ‘fast and furious’ marked by 
rapid cross-border transmission. The idea of a fast and furious ‘contagion’ was coined by 
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh who said these episodes were defined by significant and 
immediate effects in a number of countries following an event. Fears that Greek bondholders 
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would end up taking huge loses made worldwide news and greatly concerned those who owned 
Portuguese, Irish, Italian and Spanish debt (Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh, 2004). 
Lane also provides some important insights on the reforms put in place that aim to address 
sovereign debt concerns. He argues that, although the new system of reforms focuses on the 
structural budget balance, the implementation of it faces many severe problems. The first, he 
highlights, is the measurement problem associated with the reform as it requires macroeconomic 
forecasters to differentiate between cyclical fluctuations and trend fluctuations in output in 
almost real time. Furthermore, he highlights the idea that because the primary source of fiscal 
discipline under the new reforms is expected to come at the national level, many of the countries 
may not choose to include these rules in their domestic legislation and thus, external sanctions 
may be utilized (Lane, 2012).  
Some of the solutions that Lane puts forward will be examined further in-depth during the 
review of each individual nation, including a number of more extensive reforms. The first 
solution he offers is the creation of a banking union. He believes the banking union must include 
European-level regulatory responsibility, deposit insurance, a joint fiscal back-drop and bank 
resolution policies. It is important to note that Stiglitz also supports these reforms and believes 
they are necessary in the region for a successful recovery. A second and unique idea he offers is 
that of common areawide ‘Eurobonds’. The goal of these bonds is to avoid the disruptive impact 
of destabilizing speculative attacks on sovereign debt markets in individual countries. Lane also 
believes that members of the Eurozone may seek a deeper level of fiscal union. This will allow 
them to share certain tax streams or spending programs in a way that would be delinked from 
fluctuations in individual nations output levels. However, he does highlight that for this to take 
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place changes would have to be made to the treaties that govern the European Union along with 
an increase in the level of political integration throughout the region (Lane, 2012).   
When reviewing the individual case studies within the Eurozone, a complete examination of the 
countries labor markets must also be examined. Although many of the economists above offer 
solutions on how to deal with the crisis, they do not focus on the idea of reforms within the 
private sector and the labor market. In his paper, The Microeconomic Dimensions of the 
Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve them (2015), Christian Thimann 
argues that the microeconomic dimensions of the crisis and private-sector issues typically get far 
less attention than the macroeconomic and public sector considerations and policies. Thimann 
argues that there are two main problems that need to be fixed with regards to the labor market 
and the private sector if the crisis is to end. The first being the underlying competitiveness 
problem due to high labor costs relative to underlying productivity. The second being the 
widespread structural barriers that make job creation in these countries far more difficult than 
other economies in the western world and even emerging economies. The relationship between 
these two problems will be examined with respect to each individual case study in the Eurozone 
(Thimann, 2015). 
2.5 Argentinian Debt Crisis of 2001-2002 
One of the key reasons why the Argentinian Debt Crisis is a focus of this thesis is due in part to 
the robust recovery the country experienced from its devastating crisis. Although the crisis itself 
was fundamentally different than what was seen in European and East Asian nations, it os 
important to examine its causes and the ensuing aftermath. 
One of the most important pieces of literature that directly relates to the Argentinian Debt Crisis 
is an article put together by the International Monetary Fund and Timothy Geithner. In the 
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article, Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina (2003), the authors are quick to identify the crisis 
itself as the result of significant price deflation through the actions of the currency board regime 
precluding direct money financing of fiscal deficits. The IMF and Geithner further highlight the 
idea that the currency board was to blame for the crisis when they argue that the board itself was 
a very risky enterprise as its policies changed over time to a ‘fiscal-dominant’ regime as coined 
in the article. Furthermore, as the country entered into a recession, the buildup of foreign-
currency denominated public debt was a major issue as the Argentinian peso had lost much of its 
value (Geithner, 2003). 
In addition, the paper also examines the policies put in place by the IMF prior to the crisis and 
during the years of 2001 and 2002. They begin by highlighting the fact that the country was 
engaged in a number of IMF-supported programs in the years leading up to the crisis and 
acknowledge the fact that they overestimated the nation’s potential growth while also 
underestimating its overall vulnerabilities. With the benefit of hindsight, the article 
acknowledges that a potentially better policy measure that could have been implemented 
following the nation entering a recession would have been to restructure the nation’s debt 
combined with the release of the currency board and pegged exchange rate (Geithner, 2003). 
It is important to note there are other differing schools of thought regarding what caused the 
Argentinian crisis such as the lack of fiscal tightening (Mussa, 2002), the currency board and 
exchange rate regime (Feldstein, 2002) and the reversal of capital flows to Latin America in late 
1998 (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002). Another important belief is brought forward by Weisbrot (2015), 
who argues that the crisis had a lot to do with misguided procyclical policies promoted by the 
IMF. The use of these pieces and opinions of the authors were helpful in the examination of 
Argentina as an individual case study. 
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2.6 East Asian Crisis of 1997-1998 
The East Asian Crisis was unique in its form for a number of reasons. One of these key reasons 
being that it affected some of the most rapidly developing economies in the world and many 
economists, rating agencies and governments didn’t see it coming. A common view of why the 
crisis took place is that the structural and political decisions in the nations created weak 
economic conditions. However, these issues were further plagued by market overreaction and 
speculation that caused major declines in asset prices, exchange rates, and overall economic 
activity. Although much of the literature differs with regards to what started the crisis, there is a 
common view point that the role of the IMF added both to the panic and further contraction of 
economic activity in the region. The crisis itself proves to be of significance to the development 
of this thesis as it was greatly affected by the response of the IMF and the overall structure of the 
nations prior to the crisis. 
One of the seminal pieces on the topic was put forward by Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini titled 
What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis? (1998). They believe that there are two 
schools of thinking into what caused the crisis. The first being that sudden shifts in market 
expectations and confidence were the key sources of the initial financial turmoil. In other words, 
the reason why the crisis was so prolonged and spread from nation-to-nation was because of 
panic displayed by domestic and international investors, along with the response of the 
International Monetary Fund. The other view of why the crisis took place is that the crisis 
reflected structural and polity distortions in the countries of the region such as lax regulation and 
supervision. In other words, the authors believe that fundamental imbalances triggered the crisis 
(Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1998).  
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One of the main problems that is believed to have affected the countries was the moral hazard 
problem at both the domestic and international level. This problem can better be understood as 
the structure of incentives under which the corporate and financial sectors operated in the region 
and the close links between both public and private institutions. Other issues they put forward 
include a long list of structural distortions in the regions’ pre-crisis banking sector. For example, 
lax supervision and weak regulation, low capital adequacy ratios, and insufficient expertise in the 
regulatory institutions are all highlighted (Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1998).  
There is no doubting the significance of the current account imbalances in the crisis as well. The 
authors put forward the belief, as outlined by Lawrence Summers, the US Deputy Treasury 
Secretary at the time, that close attention should be paid to any current account deficit that is in 
excess of 5 percent of GDP. With that being said, many of the nations in the region, including 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand all, had deficits of greater than 5 percent of GDP. This 
will be an important statistic to examine when comparing these individual nations to the 
European case studies (Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1998).  
A second seminal piece on the crisis was put forward by Paul Krugman titled What Happened to 
Asia? (1998). Krugman believes that one of the key reasons the crisis took place was because 
investors knew that their investments were to weak borrowers, but they felt protected by explicit 
and implicit guarantees. In other words, Krugman greatly believes the crisis was a result of the 
role of financial intermediaries and the moral hazard associated with these intermediaries when 
they are exposed to a lax regulatory framework. He believes that this idea of moral hazard along 
with the artificially high prices of real assets such as capital and land were the two main causes 
of the crisis in the region (Krugman, 1998). 
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These ideas are in sharp contrast with Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs who argue in their paper, 
The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis (1998), that the main reason for the crisis was the 
role of financial panic across the region. They place a large focus on the massive foreign capital 
inflows into the financial systems that were already susceptible to speculation and panic. To 
highlight this, they state that in the five Asian countries hit hardest by the crisis, net private 
inflows dropped from $93 billion to -$12.1 billion from the onset of the crisis to the end of 1998. 
A number of international and domestic reasons are stated as to why there was a surge in capital 
inflows including: capital market liberalization, new bond and equity mutual funds, increasing 
economic growth within the region and wide-ranging financial deregulation (Radelet & Sachs, 
1998).  
Radelet and Sachs also put forward the argument that one of the reasons why the crisis was so 
different from others, including the Latin American crises of the 1980s, was because it went 
almost undetected. In other words, many of the signals that market observers look for when 
identifying potential crises showed no issues. For example, domestic savings and investment 
rates were high throughout the region and world market conditions were favorable throughout 
the early part of the decade. It is important to note that the only warning signs that the authors 
believe should have been flagged were in Thailand, where expectations of currency depreciation 
grew and short-term debts to international banks had risen to high levels of foreign exchange 
reserves in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea (Radelet & Sachs, 1998).  
The authors conclude that the crisis itself arose from certain, but limited, emerging weaknesses, 
along with a series of negative policy decisions that triggered widespread financial panic in the 
region. It is important to note they also take a direct stance against Krugman’s approach, as they 
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believe much of the lending that was taking place was directed to private firms that did not have 
the same explicit and implicit guarantees as other investors (Radelet & Sachs, 1998).  
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Chapter 3: Case Studies 
3.1 Greece 
When examining the situation in Greece, many are quick to point to one idea they believe was 
the reason for the crisis: debt. The belief that private and government debt was the underlying 
cause is one that is widely debated and analyzed. The accumulation of debt in the country can be 
blamed on many actions and actors. In the case of Greece, there were a number of underlying 
economic conditions that greatly contributed to the country becoming the first domino to fall in 
the European sovereign debt crisis.  
However, the first important idea to look at is the increase in fiscal deficits run by the Greek 
government. This coupled with their continued goal to increase public sector employment and 
wages destabilized the structure of the monetary union in the nation. In other words, when 
Greece joined the European Monetary Union they believed they could increase their borrowing 
limit and reduce savings because of the idea that they had a safety net to fall back on. This access 
to easy credit and belief that they could rely on Eurozone members for support allowed the 
Greek government to further expand their previous deficit. On the graph below we can see the 
Greek Government’s budget deficit in percentage of the nation’s GDP: 
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 Figure 3.1: Eurostat, 1995 – 2015.  
In Figure 3.1, we are able to see the clear increase in the countries deficit to its GDP following 
the adoption of the Euro in 2002 and the eventual low point of -15.2 percent of the GDP in 2009. 
The improvement seen from 2009 to 2012 is related to the strict measures put in place by the 
EMU and the European Central Bank. However, we see the rise in the deficit again from 2012 to 
2013 and 2014 to 2015. The key reason behind the deficit increasing in these years was because 
of a steep fall in economic activity, which sharply reduced tax revenues. These inconsistencies 
are one of the many reasons for the animosity towards the policy measures put in place by the 
group known as the Troika (the ECB, EMU and IMF). These measures will be examined in 
detail in the next chapter. 
It is important to note that following the adoption of the euro, Greece also experienced sustained 
GDP growth (a theme that appears to be common throughout the examination of other case 
studies as well). This growth can be attributed to a number of reasons, including access to new 
trading partners who had also adopted the euro in 2001, a growing shipping sector, and increased 
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
6
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
8
Ja
n
-9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
Ja
n
-1
5G
o
ve
rm
en
t 
D
ef
ic
it
 P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
Greek Government Budget: 1995-2015
41 
 
tourism and construction as a result of the Olympics in 2004. The steady growth in the nation’s 
Real GDP and eventual decline in 2008 is shown graphically below: 
 
 Figure 3.2: World Bank, 1995 – 2015.  
As previously mentioned, one of the key reasons for the increase in the country’s deficit was 
because of the steady rise in wages (this will further be examined when looking at the rigidity of 
the Greek labor market). This rise in wages is graphically represented in Figure 3. below: 
 
 Figure 3.3: IKA Greece, 2002 – 2016. 
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This quickly rose to a level of around 1460 Euro/Month. It is important to note that this examines 
workers in both the public and private sector, with the public sector making up 30 percent of all 
Greek employment (one of the highest in the Eurozone). 
This increase in average monthly salary is one of the underpinnings of the rigidity of the Greek 
labor market. As previously mentioned, the Greek public sector was one of the largest in Europe, 
with each member being granted a very generous pension and granted impressive unemployment 
benefits. Furthermore, members of the private sector were mostly unionized, which meant there 
were strict employment guidelines and minimum wage laws that had to be followed, regardless 
of productivity and efficiency.  
This steady increase in wages, along with the decrease in unemployment, led the nation down a 
slippery slope with regards to their budget deficit as seen on the previous page. From the graph 
below we can see the unemployment rate in Greece from 1998 until 2016: 
 
 Figure 3.4: National Statistical Service of Greece, 1998 – 2016.  
From Figure 3.4 we see the initial decrease in unemployment following Greece adopting the 
common currency in 2002. One of the more telling observations from the graph is the fact that 
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the lowest level of unemployment at around 7 percent was in May of 2008, right before the U.S. 
centered crisis began. However, we see that by July of 2013, the unemployment rate was at an 
all-time high around 28 percent. One of the reasons why these unemployment numbers rose is 
because many people decided to leave the labor market all together. A contributing factor to this, 
as previously mentioned, can be attributed to the very generous unemployment benefits workers 
received.  
The issue of debt is one that cannot be overlooked. In the case of Greece, debt will be examined 
by analyzing total public debt and external public debt. More specifically, it is important to focus 
on the composition of public debt in the nation. It is important to note that public debt is another 
term for government debt, while external public debt refers to the government debt that was 
borrowed from foreign lenders (commercial banks, governments or international financial 
institutions). From the graph below we can see the percentage of public debt in comparison to 
the country’s GDP: 
 
 Figure 3.5: Eurostat, 1995 – 2015. 
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We see that Greece’s government debt to GDP comparison was consistently around 100 percent 
from 1995 to 2008. It is important to note that this was considerably above the European average 
of 75.12 percent during the same time.   
Another important piece of data that is important to examine is Greece’s external debt in 
comparison with the entire Euro Area. This is shown below on the graph: 
 
 Figure 3.6: European Central Bank, 2004 – 2016.  
From the graph, we see external debt levels of Greece in comparison with the entire Euro Area in 
hundreds of millions of euros. It is important to observe that the graph is constructed to show the 
growth of external debt by putting in place two y-axes. The growth of external debt is roughly 
the same with the exception of a larger rise in Greek debt from 2008-2009. This external debt 
played a key role in the advancement of the crisis in Greece, but cannot be blamed as one of the 
key underlying causes. Where it did impact the nation was following the announcement in 2009 
that the country had been running a larger deficit than previously announced. The result of this 
was rising spreads on sovereign bonds, with much of them being held externally. Bond yields are 
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the amount a return an investor realizes on a bond. The key reason for bond yields to rise is 
because investors now view them as riskier investments. We can see this on the graph below: 
  
  Figure 3.7: Public Debt Management Agency, 1998 – 2017.  
From the graph, we see the initial rise in bond’s yield in 2010 that continues through 2011 as a 
result of the crisis continuing to expand through the government’s inability to repay prior loans. 
We can also see the decline in the yields in 2012 after the repayment plan was constructed and 
administered. It is important to note that the ECB’s initial Securities Market Program (SMP) was 
put in place in May 2010. The objective of this plan was to have EU banks buy Greek bonds to 
help provide stability. However, this was short lived and by July 2011, EU policy makers were 
forcing EU banks to accept voluntary 50 percent haircuts on Greek bonds. A ‘haircut’ refers to 
the difference between prices at which a market maker can buy and sell a security. In other 
words, Greek bonds were being discounted by half of their previous value. We can see the effect 
of this on the graph above with the sharp rise in the yield in mid-2011.  
From looking at the data above it’s clear that Greece had major domestic economic issues in the 
years and decades leading up to the start of the crisis in 2009. To say that these issues were the 
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cause of foreign actors would be inaccurate and unfair. Greece’s policy makers and politicians 
have to take serious responsibility for allowing reckless government spending that led to a major 
budget deficit. However, the actions of the troika following the crisis did not have the intended 
effects and have further prolonged the economic downturn in Greece. These policy implications 
and potential solutions will be examined in detail in the next chapter. 
3.2 Italy 
When examining Italy, a similar emphasis must also be placed on the issue of public debt within 
the economy. Italy proves to be an interesting and important case study because of its close 
geographical proximity to Greece, along with the common belief that the two nations share 
similar socio-economic policies and labor market structures including: a large public work force, 
large government pensions, and lax vacation policies. In the view of Italian nationals, this labor 
market structure is widely accepted, but in the view of other Eurozone countries, such as France 
and Germany, this is by no means the case. Furthermore, the cause of the crisis in Italy seems to 
be a two-pronged approach, as the country was also greatly affected by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008.  
Similar to Greece, Italy ran a government deficit for many of the years leading up to the start of 
the crisis. However, one of the other underlying issues that impacted the nation was the fact that 
it had experienced little economic growth in the years leading up to the crisis. From the graph 
below we are able to see the deficit the government ran from 1996 to 2006: 
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 Figure 3.8: Eurostat, 1996 – 2016. 
From the graph, we see a somewhat similar pattern to Greece following the country adopting the 
Euro as a common currency. The Italians adopted the currency at the start of 2002, and following 
that we see an increase in the deficit from 3 percent to 4 percent. However, we do see the 
government was able to improve the deficit from 2005 through 2007, as a result of the nation’s 
stability program that was implemented in 2004. However, as Italy’s GDP growth fell from 
around .5 percent from 2007 to 2008 to -7 percent from 2008-2009, the budget took a major hit 
as a result of falling tax revenues. 
The key reasons for this significant drop in GDP growth can be attributed to the lack of 
productivity in the Italian economy along with widespread government corruption, in other 
words overall economic growth in the country was at a standstill. With regards to lack of 
productivity, Italy is one of the nations that spends the least on research and development in the 
Eurozone. They also have a marginal labor market that needs serious structural reforms (this will 
be examined in the policy and discussion chapter). As well it the Bank of Italy estimated that as 
of 2014 10 percent of the nation’s economic activity is run by the mafia and black market, 
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Ja
n
-9
6
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
8
Ja
n
-9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
Ja
n
-1
5
Ja
n
-1
6
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
D
ef
ic
it
 P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
G
D
P
Italian Government Budget: 1996 - 2016
48 
 
costing the government roughly 100 billion euros a year (The Independent, 2014).  The 
fluctuation in the nations GDP growth is shown graphically below: 
 
 Figure 3.9: World Bank, 2002-2015. 
The Italian government’s budget was not the only thing that led to the crisis. Another major 
contributing factor was the amount of debt the government held. Italy’s debt ratio is the second 
worst in the Eurozone behind Greece. From the graph below we can see the nation’s debt in 
comparison to its GDP:   
 
Figure 3.10: Eurostat, 1995 – 2015. 
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We are able to see that Italian government debt to GDP levels were consistently above 100 
percent from 1995 to 2015. These levels reached an all-time of 132.7 percent in January of 2015. 
This is significant because, unlike Greece, whose ratio seems to be evening out, the Italians keep 
growing. This may suggest that the worst has yet to come for the nation. 
It is also important to examine the extremely high levels of the Italian government’s external 
debt. Italy as a nation has the highest amounts of external debt within the Eurozone. This is 
shown graphically below: 
 
Figure 3.11: Banca D’Italia, 2002 – 2015. 
From the graph above we can see the consistently high levels of external debt in the Italian 
economy from 2002 to 2015. These levels of debt are high, but do not make up the majority the 
nation’s overall debt. However, over the last year there has been a sharp increase in the external 
debt levels of the country. One of the key reasons for this is because of the Italian government 
recapitalizing and deleveraging the country’s largest banks with 21 billion euros. However, many 
foreign institutions, including Qatar’s sovereign-wealth fund, have held off on investing thus far. 
This policy decision will be examined more in depth in the next chapter. 
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With that being said, Italy also suffered from the crash of the American Banking sector, 
specifically the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
there was major pressure on the interbank loan market, where banks refused to lend money to 
each other because of a lack of liquidity and confidence about the stability of borrowers. Banks 
reduced the availability of credit to clients in order to buildup liquidity that was previously lost. 
What was unique about Italian banks, was that they had links with central and eastern European 
nations in previous decades that extended their network of branches to candidate countries. 
These links led to questions about the financial stability of this network, and, as a result led, to 
many banks taking precautions. Two of the key policies that were implemented were reducing 
credit to clients and consumers and raising the amount of collateral that was required for loans. 
The result of this was a decrease in spending by customers and a collapse of a number of 
individual sectors within the economy including real manufacturing and construction. Data taken 
from the Italian government shows a decline in Real GDP from the construction sector from 
approximately 23,850 million euro in May of 2008 to a low of approximately 15,960 million 
euro in December of 2016 (ISTAT, 2016). With that being said, it is clear that this decrease in 
credit during an economic downturn is one of the fundamental points of the financial accelerator 
model. As credit becomes more expensive, due to the fact that lenders are less likely to give it 
out, firms are unable to access it in the same manner as before and, thus, there is a clear decrease 
in investment and consumption.  
As in Greece, it is important to examine the impact the crisis had on unemployment in the nation. 
From the graph below we are able to disarm the unemployment rate from 1997 to 2017: 
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Figure 3.12: National Institute of Statistics, 1997-2017.  
From the graph above we observe a similar pattern to that of Greece. Following the adoption of 
the common currency in 2002, Italy experienced five years of a continuous decline in the 
unemployment rate reaching a twenty-year low in April of 2007 at 5.7 percent. However, it 
sharply increased and reached a twenty-year high of 13.1 percent in November of 2014.  
Another important piece of data to examine is the yield curve of the Italian 10Y government 
bond: 
 
 Figure 3.13: Dipartimento Del Tesoro, 1997-2017. 
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There are a few important points that arise from examining the yield on Italy’s 10Y government 
bond. The first being the sharp rise from the start of 2011 until the end of 2011. One of the key 
reasons for this taking place was because of the role of speculators and investors. Another 
important factor that led to this spike in yields was due to the fear of contagion from the Greek 
crisis and the reaction of Greek government bonds (Arghyrou & Tsoukalas, 2010). Following the 
announcement of the Greek accounting problems, traders began to look for their next target. 
More specifically, they looked for the nation that would be most impacted in a negative manor 
by the ECB’s monetary policies. The result of this was a major sell-off of Italian bonds during 
these months, which lead to a dramatic decline in their price and an increase in yield. On top of 
this, European banks that held these bonds suffered a major loss in the value of these assets. To 
make the situation even worse, traders began to short European bank stocks leading to wide 
spread panic in the European financial sector (Weisbrot, 2015). Why traders and speculators 
were able to do this is an important and critical question that will be examined in the next 
chapter. However, it is the view of many economists that the ECB was fully in the wrong by 
allowing the nation to teeter on the brink of a full financial meltdown through speculation from 
outside traders (Weisbrot, 2015). 
It is also important to look at the steady decline in yields beginning in March 2012. One of the 
popular beliefs of why this took place was because of improved overall macroeconomic stability 
in the global economy. The second, and more controversial belief, places the blame on the 
monetary policy implemented by central bank policy, more specifically through Outright 
Monetary Transactions (this policy and the controversy surrounding it will be examined in 
Chapter 4). This policy itself was one of the keystone’s Mario Draghi’s 2012 announcement that 
the ECB will do whatever it takes to combat the financial crisis (Draghi, 2012). The central goal 
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of this policy is to push inflation up and yields down through the purchase of bonds. Although 
this may prove to be effective in the short run, there is much debate over whether it is an 
effective long term strategy.  
It can be said that similar to Greece, the underlying cause of the crisis in Italy was engineered 
domestically through minimal economic growth and decline in government revenues that led to 
an increasing fiscal deficit. However, the nations also shared the fact that their deficits were the 
result of many other issues including: government corruption, black market transactions and lack 
of productivity in the labor force (Hatzigeorgiou, 2014).  
3.3 Portugal 
One of the major reasons for the start of the crisis in Portugal was the role of domestic financial 
institutions. Along with Greece and Ireland, these countries were the first to enter into the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Like the two previous case studies examines, they required strict 
fiscal austerity packages and structural reforms to help boost economic growth in the country. 
With that being said, Portugal is a very interesting case study for this thesis because of its 
economic history and geographical location. The fact that its separated, along with Spain, from 
the other nations examined helps to prove the point that the Eurozone crisis was not limited to 
one region on the continent.  
With that being said, it will be important to first examine the Portuguese government’s budget in 
the years leading up and following the crisis. This is shown in the graph below:  
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 Figure 3.14: Eurostat, 2002 – 2016. 
From the graph, we are able to track the deficit that the government of Portugal ran for the last 
twenty years. It is important to note that there are similar features of the graph to those of Greece 
and Italy. Following the full implementation of the euro as a common currency in 2002, we 
notice an increase in the deficit in the following years from around 4 to 6 percent of GDP. Like 
the nations previously examined, Portugal now had access to easy credit and this in turn led to a 
reduction in private savings along with an increase in consumption and investment. One of the 
potential reasons for this is because consumers and investors expected an increase in the future 
wealth of the country and, as a result, it is possible they substituted future for present 
consumption. Although they were able to improve on this in the following years, the deficit 
eventually dropped to a twenty year low of 11.2 percent in 2010 before strict policy measures 
were implemented by the ECB. 
Another critical reason for this decline in economic activity within Portugal was because of sharp 
increases in nominal wage growth that greatly outpaced overall labor productivity growth. Like 
the cases of Greece and Italy, Portugal was known to have a relatively rigid labor market. The 
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reasons for this stem from high employment protection, very strong government influence of 
wages, and generous unemployment and retirement benefits. We are able to observe the nations 
slow real GDP growth below. This slow growth coupled with an increasing government deficit 
were two of the contributing factors to Portugal’s financial crisis.  
 
 Figure 3.15: World Bank, 2002-2015. 
Still, Portugal was able to maintain somewhat healthy debt levels relative to the cases previously 
examined. From the graph below we are able to trace their government debt to GDP levels:  
 
 Figure 3.16: Eurostat, 1996 – 2016. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Portuguese Real GDP (USD Billions)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Ja
n
-9
6
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
8
Ja
n
-9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
Ja
n
-1
5
Ja
n
-1
6
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t 
D
eb
t 
as
 %
 o
f 
G
D
P
Portuguese Government Debt to GDP
56 
 
Portuguese debt to GDP was relatively stable throughout much of the 1990s and into the early 
2000s. This was in sharp contrast to the case of Italy’s government debt which accounted for 
roughly 100 percent of GDP during the same time. However, we do observe a sharp increase in 
2008 to 2013. The key reason for this sharp rise in government debt is because of austerity 
measures and bailout packages imposed by the IMF and EU program (the criticism surrounding 
these policies will be examined in the next chapter). However, the Portuguese government also 
decided to utilize expansionary monetary policies, following the global recession of 2008-2009, 
to help combat the potential shocks on the domestic economy.  
The role of debt was also a critical factor in the case of Portugal. It is important to note that 
foreigners, in the form of financial institutions, sovereign wealth managers and asset managers, 
held around 70 percent of Portuguese debt. We can observe the levels of external debt below:  
 
Figure 3.17: Banco de Portugal, 1996 – 2016.  
We are able to see the steady rise in foreign held Portuguese debt over the last twenty years with 
the high point coming in the second quarter of 2010, right before the nation accepted the bailout 
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package offered by the EU and IMF. The graph above mimics a similar pattern to that of Greece 
and other Eurozone nations. 
One of the results of the high levels of debt and slow economic growth was a sharp increase in 
the yield of Portuguese government bonds. Although there was some hope that Portugal would 
be able to undergo fiscal consolidation, the over arching situation across the rest of Europe led 
many investors to believe that Portugal was the next domino to fall. From the graph below we 
can see the impact on Portuguese 10Y yields: 
 
 Figure 3.18: IGCP, 1997 – 2017Q1.  
We notice the sharp rise in the yields of Portuguese 10Y government bonds in March of 2011 up 
until the end of the year. Although speculators had previously driven up yields, it wasn’t until 
Fitch, the rating’s agency, lowered the nation’s credit rating from A+ to BBB-, along with 
Standard and Poor’s from A- to BBB-. In the years following, we observe yields began to drop 
as a result of rising bond prices through QE. However, over the last two years, yields are 
beginning to rise again as it is feared that the ECB may remove the ability to participate in 
Outright Monetary Transactions as Portugal’s credit rating improves.  
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There is no doubting the fact that the Portuguese economy was extremely fragile in the years 
leading up to the crisis. However, we can infer from many of the statistics above that the country 
was not struggling to the same extent as Greece and Italy. In fact, the implementation of IMF-EU 
program in April of 2011 led to a sharp rise in the nation’s government debt to GDP ratio and 
amount of external debt. That said, speculation did play a role in the increasing yields on 
Portuguese government debt and almost forced the government into accepting the austerity 
measures put forward by the EU and IMF.  
3.4 Spain 
When examining the case of the Spanish economy in the context of the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, there are many unique differences that separate it from other case studies. One of the most 
notable being the fact that in the years leading up to the crisis, Spain was running a government 
budget surplus and not a deficit. From the outside, many aspects of the Spanish economy 
appeared to be fundamentally sound. With that being said, there were other components of the 
financial sector that were not as stable and that contributed greatly to the nation experiencing a 
crisis similar to that of Italy and Greece. The key reason why the crisis in Spain was 
fundamentally different was because it was caused by a domestic housing bubble in the country, 
similar to that of the crisis in the U.S.  
It is important to paint a picture of the Spanish economy in the years following its adoption of 
the euro. From the graph below we are able to trace the government’s budget from 2002 to 2015: 
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 Figure 3.19: Eurostat, 2002 – 2015. 
From the graph above we can deduce that from 2002 to 2007 the Spanish government was 
running a surplus. However, in 2007 the economy began to falter and by 2009 the country’s 
deficit was at 11 percent of GDP. The main driver behind this sharp decline was the overall 
health of the global economic sector. The key take away from the data above is that Spain did 
not rely on the easy-credit that came with adopting the euro as a common currency in 2002, like 
many of the other member states. 
Another indicator that would lead many economists to believe that Spain’s economy was healthy 
in the years leading up to the crisis was the nation’s low government debt to GDP ratio:  
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 Figure 3.20: Eurostat, 1995 – 2015. 
From the graph above we can determine that in comparison to the prior case studies, the Spanish 
government’s debt to GDP was relatively low. It was not until the financial crisis of 2008 that it 
began to rise. One of the reasons for the continued increase in government debt was the fact that 
the nation accepted a 100-billion-euro bank bailout put in place by the EU (this money will come 
from the European Financial Stability Facility, which was set up to help members that are 
experiencing financial distress, and not from the IMF).  
It is important to examine why the nation’s banks were forced to accept this bailout in the first 
place. During the 1990s and 2000s the Spanish economy enjoyed a period of unprecedented 
growth. Many economists, at the time, viewed Spain as the posterchild of the Eurozone. The 
result of this growth encouraged a number of sectors of the economy to expand rapidly. One of 
these sectors was the real estate market. One of the major reasons why this took place was the 
consistent inflow of foreign capital into the country, which came on the heels of its membership 
into the EMU. This, along with the ability to access cheap credit, allowed the sector to take off. 
Because of this housing boom, the Spanish government received extra tax revenues through 
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rising asset prices, high construction activity, and capital inflows. On the graph below we are 
able to track the steady rise in the Spanish housing market and the eventual decline beginning in 
2007, shortly after the U.S. decline: 
 
 Figure 3.21: Ministerio de Fomento, 1996 – 2016. 
Although the Spanish housing market first began to show signs of weakness at the end of 2006, 
due to a slowdown in the construction sector, the U.S. financial crisis and the global freezing of 
credit in 2007 was what really impacted the nation’s economy. Over the next few years, growth, 
investment and consumption began to decrease. This brought to light Spain’s dependence on 
foreign credit. However, it is important to note that although Spanish public debt was low, 
private external debt was very high, which exasperated both the mismatch on maturities and 
currencies. The impact on employment in the country was also so great that it drove 
unemployment to the same levels set in Greece:  
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 Figure 3.22: National Statistics Institute, 1996 – 2016. 
 
The impact of the housing bubble also led to major losses within the Spanish banking sector. The 
reason for this was because many of the banks had to now cut their losses from bad-loans they 
gave out. As of 2015, non-performing loans as a percent of all bank loans in the country were at 
approximately 6.3 percent (World Bank, 2015). On top of this, many speculators thought the 
next potential downfall would be in the financial sector and, as a result, began betting on the 
drop in price of government bonds. The impact on the bonds’ yield was not good. From the 
graph below, we can see the Spanish 10Y government bond yields: 
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 Figure 3.23: Tesoro Public, 1997 – 2016. 
From the graph, we notice a similar pattern to that of the previous case studies. For example, one 
can note an initial speculative attack by outside investors due to suspected weaknesses in the 
economy that causes a spike in yields. This is followed by a rise in the price of bonds and 
reduction in their yield as the EU begins to purchase the bonds being offered by the country.  
It is clear that the crisis in Spain was fundamentally different. Although there were major 
economic weaknesses in the nation prior to joining the European monetary union, the country 
had less red flags then many of its counterparts. The ability for Spanish banks to access easy 
credit following the adoption of the euro ultimately led to the nation’s demise as housing prices 
skyrocketed and the cracks in the Spanish economy were brought to light following the U.S. 
financial crisis. What remains to be seen is whether or not the bank bailout adopted by Spain will 
be successful. This policy will be examined in the next chapter, but what is important to 
remember is that their bailout was not only smaller than other nations, but was also orchestrated 
without the role of the IMF.  
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3.5 Ireland 
Ireland is another important nation to examine when looking at the sovereign debt crisis. 
Although the four previous nations that were analyzed shared similar geographic locations, 
Ireland is geographically independent. This is important to note as it further proves that the crisis 
throughout the Eurozone affected nations of all backgrounds. Similar to the crisis in Spain, the 
Irish crisis was fueled by a housing bubble and bad loans made by banks. Ireland enjoyed an 
extended period of economic prosperity from 1997 – 2007 and it was dubbed the Celtic Tiger. 
As the economy continued to expand and foreign investment flowed into the nation, there was a 
major rise in real estate and commercial development. These developments were supported by 
loans made by Irish banks that had access to cheap credit.   
Like Spain, when looking at some of the pre-crisis risk factors that have come to define other 
nations in the Eurozone, Ireland was relatively stable. From the graph below we can see the 
government budget of Ireland from 2002 to 2015: 
 
 Figure 3.24: Eurostat, 2002 – 2015. 
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The Irish government was able to run a solid government surplus from 2002 until the financial 
crisis of 2007, and it wasn’t until 2010 that the nation reached a record low deficit of 32.9 
percent as a result of the policies recommended by the ECB. Another important observation to 
note is that Ireland, like Spain, did not enter into a deficit following the adoption of the euro in 
2002. To further understand why many economists believed that the Irish economy was 
fundamentally strong, the nation’s sustained GDP growth in the years leading up to the crisis 
must also be examined:  
 
 Figure 3.25: World Bank, 2002 – 2015.  
Similar to the case of Portugal, we notice a steady rise in Ireland’s Real GDP following the 
adoption of the euro in 2002. From 2002 until 2008 the nation’s GDP increased by over 100 
percent. One of the most important reasons this took place was because of Ireland’s low 
corporate tax rate. Ireland’s corporate tax system is divided up into two separate rates: trading 
income and non-trading income. The trading income rate is 12.5 percent while the non-trading 
income rate is 25 percent. As more and more foreign companies set up shop in Ireland, the 
demand for real estate continued to rise, further fueling the nation’s bubble. From the graph 
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below we are able to observe the rise in Irish residential housing prices and the eventual decline 
in 2008: 
 
 Figure 3.26: Central Statistics Office Ireland, 2005 – 2016. 
The index that the Central Statistics Office of Ireland uses is one that measures the change in the 
average level of prices paid by households for residential properties sold in Ireland. From the 
graph above we see the steady rise in housing prices from 2005 to 2008. However, following the 
crash of 2008, prices crashed over 50 percent to low a point in the second quarter of 2013. 
Another key area of the Irish economy where there were clear signs of instability was the 
reliance on external funding by domestic banks through global short-term debt markets. As there 
was increasing demand for real estate in the country, banks tapped into debt markets to help fill 
the demand for loans. When the crisis hit and Irish banks were unable to obtain the necessary 
credit, the financial sector was on the edge of a full meltdown. It is important to note that as of 
2015, non-performing loans comprised 14.9 percent of all bank loans in the nation (World Bank, 
2015). However, in comparison to many of the other case studies examined, Ireland had very 
sustainable levels of public debt in the years leading up to the crisis. The issue pertained to the 
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private sector and banks continuing to give out loans to finance commercial and residential 
projects (during the peak of the bubble 2006, the construction sector made up 25 percent of the 
nation’s GDP). From the graph below we can see the steady growth in Ireland’s external debt 
from 2002 to 2008: 
 
 Figure 3.27: Central Statistics Office Ireland, 2002 – 2016. 
As previously mentioned, the rise in the nation’s external debt as seen above greatly contributed 
to Irish banks tapping into foreign debt markets to help finance the real estate boom. As the 
bubble began to burstm Irish banks were highly leveraged and had balance sheets that were 
dominated by bad loans and falling asset prices. 
Speculators and traders were quick to pick up on the crisis in Ireland. As a result of this, they 
began to drive up Irish government bond’s yield as shown on the graph below: 
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 Figure 3.28: Ireland Department of Treasury, 2002 – 2017Q1. 
The graph above depicts the initial leap in the yields of these bonds in the second half of 2010 
and into 2012. The yield curve first shifted because of Ireland being locked out of the bond 
market through the EU and IMF joint policies (they accepted an 85-billion-euro package to help 
de-lever and recapitalize the nation’s banking sector). Yields moved again as investors and 
speculators thought that they would default on these bonds. However, we notice that there is a 
sharp decline in yields following the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT).  
From examining the case of Ireland, we are able to conclude that like Spain, the cause of the 
crisis was fundamentally different than what transpired in Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Although 
the nation had sustainable levels of public debt to GDP and was not running a deficit, there were 
still underlying issues in the economy, such as, the dependence on global short-term debt 
markets to sustain the real estate bubble. It is important to note that signs of recovery in Ireland 
are being seen as unemployment continues to decline while GDP has risen over the last four 
years. The key to the nations long-term efforts will lay in their ability to diversify their economy 
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and attract foreign corporations looking to take advantage of the low corporate tax rate. The fact 
that Ireland has strong fundamentals in terms of both productivity and FDI is also likely to 
impact their recovery in a positive way. 
3.6 Argentina  
The crisis in Argentina is fundamentally important to analyze when looking at sovereign debt 
crises throughout the last two decades. Like many of the PIIGS nations, the Argentinian 
government ran a deficit leading up to their crisis. One of the main reasons for this deficit was 
because of pro-cyclical fiscal policies utilized by the Argentinian government. On top of this, 
many point to the Argentinian peso being pegged to the U.S. dollar as another major reason for 
the crash. It is important to note that the reason why Argentina kept their peso pegged to the U.S. 
dollar for so long was because it not only helped eliminate hyperinflation in the nation, but it also 
provided the potential framework for sustained economic growth. Furthermore, it also led to a 
sharp increase in FDI inflows to the country while attaining price stability (Baer, Elosegui & 
Gallo, 2002). If the currency became competitive enough to generate large trade surpluses and 
foreign exchange earnings so the country could pay interest on the large amounts of international 
debt that it owed, the fixed rate could have worked 
Like many of the previous nations being examined, Argentina enjoyed years of economic growth 
prior to its financial crisis. One of the key reasons for this being its strong manufacturing sector. 
From the graph below we are able to observe the growth in the Argentinian Real GDP in the 
years leading up to the crisis. 
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 Figure 3.29: World Bank, 1995 – 2015.  
From the graph below we can trace the deficit that the country was running in the years leading 
up to the crisis in 2001: 
 
 Figure 3.30: Banco Central De La Republica Argentina, 2000 – 2015.  
Like many of the European case studies, we notice that, prior to the crisis, the government was 
running a budget deficit. It is important to note that the improvement of the budget deficit was 
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the result of the de-valuation of the currency and movement away from the peg to the U.S. 
dollar. 
Having said this, it is also important to examine the level of debt the nation had with respect to 
its GDP: 
 
 Figure 3.31: Ministry of the Economy – Government of Argentina, 1997 – 2015 
From the graph above we see the sharp rise in government debt in respect to GDP in the year 
2002. The underlying reason for this was again the removal of the peg of the peso to the U.S. 
dollar. However, the more important discussion point from the graph is the recovery in which 
Argentina experienced following the initial crisis. We see that the nation was able to reduce its 
debt levels by around 80 percent from 2002 to 2009. This was due to a number of policy 
measures implemented by the Argentinian government that will be examined in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, the debt service as a percentage of GDP in Argentina was also extremely high in 
the years leading up the crisis at a level of approximately 74 percent in 1999 and approximately 
64 percent in 2000 (World Bank, 2000). This is an important statistic to examine, as interest and 
amortization played a key role in negatively impacting the nation. 
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Another important stylized fact to examine in the case of Argentina is external debt levels. From 
the graph below we can see the consistent rise in these levels in the years leading up to the crisis: 
 
 Figure 3.32: Instituto Nacional De Estadistica Y Censos, 1996 - 2016 
Similarly, to several of the European nations previously examined, Argentina also suffered from 
a very inflexible labor market. The government was very protective of individual workers and 
imposed high barriers to fire employees, along with the very generous unemployment benefits 
particularly at the provincial level. Although the government tried to improve labor market 
flexibility in the first half of the 1990s through fixed-term contracts, more flexible working hours 
and reduction in labor costs, the market remained very rigid throughout the period leading up to 
the crisis.  
The recovery in Argentina has been very successful relative to other nations that have 
experienced sovereign debt crises. In April of 2016, the nation re-entered the foreign bond 
market offering 16.5 billion dollars of debt (more than double the previous highs of governments 
in emerging markets). From the crisis in Argentina, we are able to reassess the issues and 
problems associated with a hard peg such as the currency board. However, we also see the 
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underlying issues associated with taking on large amounts of foreign debt. An important point to 
remember is that the Argentinian recovery was engineered without the help of the IMF. 
However, they were still able to drain 4 billion dollars out of the economy in 2002. The reason 
for this was the fund was acting on behalf of international creditors, with the goal of pressuring 
the Argentine government to pay more of its previously defaulted debt to foreign lenders.  
Contrary to popular belief, the Argentinian recovery was not orchestrated by a commodity boom, 
but instead by increasing consumption and investment within the economy that was led by the 
government abandoning its pro-cyclical policies. The policies that the Argentinian government 
chose to implement are examined in more detail in the following chapter. These policies struck at 
the core of the fundamental economic issues in the nation and aimed to provide not only labor 
market reform, but also create a realistic and manageable debt repayment schedule. Nonetheless, 
it’s important to remember the initial move to a floating regime did burst exports and lit a spark 
for the economic recovery of the nation. 
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Chapter 4: Policy and Discussion 
4.1 The Implementation of the Euro 
From the previous chapter, we can come to the conclusion that the crises in each European 
nation, along with the crisis in Argentina, were the result of clear-cut domestic economic and 
financial issues. Although these problems differed from nation-to-nation, they are all related in 
that foreign institutions and actors were not the underlying cause of them. In other words, there is 
no doubting that the fundamentalist view carries significant weight when examining the causes 
of these crises. However, it is important not to discount the fact that foreign actors still played a 
key role in the crises that were examined. Specifically, they exasperated and accelerated the 
crises in each individual nation by many of the policies they recommended and implemented. 
Although many of these policies had a negative effect on the nations, there have been some cases 
in which real and substantial economic progress has been made. This chapter will aim to 
examine the specific policies that were implemented and potential solutions and changes that 
should be made to them. It will draw on the help from other crises including the Argentinian 
crisis of 2001 and the East Asian Crisis of 1997. 
When looking at the case of the Eurozone, it is important examine potential remedies on how the 
crisis could have been avoided altogether. One of the most popular and critical solutions to this 
would have been to have kept the European Union a political union and not to create the euro as 
a common currency. Furthermore, there should have been a better understanding of the economic 
health of the nations that were invited to adopt the euro. The criteria that was used to outline 
whether or not a country would be allowed to join the euro was laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Although the nations that adopted the euro were able to fulfill the criteria set forward, albeit by 
the manipulation of their own statistics, there were still underlying economic issues. 
Furthermore, many economists working for the EU ignored potential warning signs as they 
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believed in market fundamentalism (Stiglitz, 2016). Market fundamentalism refers to a neo-
liberal belief that markets on their own are efficient and stable. For example, there were clear 
real estate bubbles forming in many of the nations during the early and mid 2000s that the 
European Union failed to deal with when offering membership. However, from the market 
fundamentalist prospective, markets do not create bubbles and, thus, no measures were taken as 
there was belief amongst policy makers that the bubbles would, for lack of a better reason, work 
themselves out (Stiglitz, 2016). When creating the monetary union, policy makers also 
underestimated the fragility of such a union if it were to be exposed to a crisis. In particular, the 
absence of both a banking union and other European-level (region-wide) mechanisms to help 
buffer against the crash of the financial sector was a major shortfall.  
Many economists also argue that it made no sense for the common currency to be adopted 
because each country was sufficiently different. In other words, there is a strong belief that the 
institutional arrangements and conditions to fill the void created by these differences were 
missing when the currency union was established (this void being filled by additional institutions 
to help them function with one another) (Stiglitz, 2016). The policy makers in the EU hoped that 
over time these countries would become more similar and converge and thus could allow the 
currency area to work reasonably well.  
With all of this being said and examined, the question of why nations such as Greece and Italy 
were even admitted into the EMU and allowed to adopt the euro as its currency must be asked. 
While Italy joined the EU in 1951 as a founding member, Greece joined the union in 1981, and 
both nations adopted the currency in 2002 as two of the first countries. There is no doubting the 
fact that EU policy makers were aware of prior economic problems within these two nations. 
This is where much of the criticism is raised; why would they allow countries with a history of 
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high debt levels in both the private and public sectors and underlying fundamental economic 
issues into a monetary union with nations that were far more economically healthy than them?  
From the analysis above we see that both nations had considerably higher levels of government 
debt than other Eurozone countries along with much larger amounts of external public debt. 
It becomes clear that the adoption of the euro as a common currency in these nations that had 
fundamental economic weaknesses was a mistake. Although there is no telling whether or not 
these crises would have happened if the countries remained out of the euro, the fact that they 
were all connected through a common monetary union led to relatively economically stable 
nations being brought into a situation they otherwise would have not had to deal with. The blame 
should not fall directly on any one member state, but instead on the creators of the Euro. 
Although their goal was to create economic stability in the region, they failed to understand that 
the European Union was created as a political tool, not an economic one. Although many of the 
political goals that policymakers hoped to accomplish through the EU have been reached, there 
is no doubting the fact that the economic challenges it has faced will forever stain its reputation.  
4.2 Eurozone Policies  
The Eurozone policies that have been put in place to deal with the crisis are viewed not only 
skeptically, but also under a microscope. Although there have been some improvements, as seen 
in Spain and Ireland, much less progress has been made in the cases of Greece and Italy. It is 
important to note that this chapter will not look at each individual reform and policy measure 
implemented by the ECB for each of the case studies being examined (Greece alone has been 
presented with thirteen separate austerity packages since the start of the crisis). Instead, it will 
examine the major bailouts as well as reforms and policy measures that were established in the 
immediate weeks and months following the initial collapse of the Greek economy. It will also 
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pay close attention to the monetary policies utilized by the ECM as a way to spur economic 
growth and limit the role of speculators.  
As an immediate response to the crisis the ECB implemented both inter-governmental 
mechanisms, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and supranational initiatives, the 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). These policy measures were replaced by 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in October of 2012. Together the EFSM and the 
EFSF, along with a 250-billion-euro commitment from the IMF, allowed total funding capacity 
for the crisis to be around 750-billion-euro (ECB, 2012).  
The EFSF was agreed upon in May of 2010 by the Council of the European Union with the 
objective of providing financial assistance to the nations in the region who were experiencing 
economic difficulty. The underlying goal of the facility was to safeguard financially stability in 
the region by raising funds in the capital markets to finance loans for euro area member states. 
The facility had allotted 440 billion euros of financial aid to the debt-ridden nations. However, to 
qualify for this rescue package, nations had to agree to very strict austerity measures put forward 
by the troika. Austerity measures refer to actions that many of these government had to take as a 
result of pressure from the Troika that forced the nations to reduce their budget deficit using a 
combination of spending cuts or tax rises. The EFSM, although similar to the EFSF, is different 
as it provided 60 billion euros in relief backed by the EU’s budget and was available to all 27 EU 
member states (ECB, 2012). The ESM has a maximum lending capacity of 500 billion euro and 
acts almost as a permanent bailout fund for European nations (ECB, 2012). It is important to note 
that the ESM was able to get the money it needed by borrowing from the financial markets 
through the selling of bonds. The largest contributors to the ESM were Eurozone governments 
led by Germany, France and Italy. 
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In the case of Greece, the European Union and the IMF approved a 110-billion-euro loan 
package to the Greek government in May of 2010. However, this loan required sharp spending 
cuts to reduce the level of Greek public debt along with other provisions. The troika targeted 
taxation, the public sector, retirement benefits, and the labor market in Greece. In the first year of 
these austerity measures, taxes were said to increase by around 2.3 billion euros while public 
sector wages are said to be cut by up to 20 percent (ECB, October 2011). Furthermore, the troika 
demanded that defense and health spending be cut by 200 and 310 million euros, respectively. It 
can be said that these cuts will undermine the future human and physical capital of the nation 
and, thus, undermine the nation’s growth potential. However, what many considered to be the 
nail in the coffin for Greek workers was the fact that monthly pensions above one thousand euros 
were to be cut by 20 percent, along with social security benefits being cut by around 1.1 billion 
euros. As we know, the response to these measures was not positive. Riots and strikes hit the 
country almost immediately and led to widespread political instability and further disrupting 
economic activity by creating uncertainty. These austerity measures have also been utilized in 
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland as a policy measure suggested by the troika in order to improve 
the economic conditions while also being able to tap into the 750-billion-euro war chest they 
created for relief (ECB, 2012). However, many economists argue that these austerity measures 
helped to further compound the crisis and not beneficially impact economic growth.  
The ECB also decided to implement standard and nonstandard monetary policy decisions. The 
banks original reaction to the crisis was to adjust interest rates downwards (because of the grim 
macroeconomic outlook). The result of this was short-term interest rates being close to zero in 
the months and years following the crisis to allow for favorable financing options. However, the 
bank quickly realized that this would not be enough and quickly led to the implementation of less 
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standard policy measures including: lending operations through fixed rate tender procedure with 
a fill allotment, the provision of liquidity maturity and an expansion of set of assets that could 
potentially serve as collateral that would allow individual nations to receive central bank 
liquidity. However, the ECB decided to go one step further and implement policies that directly 
intervened in securities markets with the most notable ones being the Securities Markets 
Program (SMP) in 2010 and the Outright Monetary Transactions Program (OMT) in 2012 (ECB, 
2012). 
The objective of the SMP was to conduct interventions within the regions public and private debt 
securities markets to make sure depth and liquidity in the markets were at stable levels. In other 
words the program aimed to deal with the malfunctioning securities markets that were being 
impacted by speculators and traders. It is important to note that this policy greatly differed from 
that of QE or other large-scale asset purchase programs, as it was not the aim of the bank to 
prevent long term yields from rising. However, the SMP went against the clear fundamentals of 
many of the economic policy makers that designed the implementation of the euro. This can be 
said because many of these policy makers believed in efficient markets, when in reality, prices 
are driven by the flow of information and will not always work efficiently. Through this 
program, the ECB was able to signal to the market that they would be buying securities, which in 
turn, immediately led to a drop in the yield of these bonds. On the opposite side of the coin, the 
SMP led to further speculation by outside investors and traders. Because there was no guarantee 
when or what securities the ECB was going to buy, speculators further infiltrated the market 
trying to figure out in which directions yields would move. 
The OMT program was implemented as a replacement to the SMP in September of 2012. This 
was one of the most controversial policies implemented by the ECB as it was conditionally 
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attached to the two bailout funds set up in the region (EFSM and EFSM). In other words, for 
nations to qualify for the OMT program they essentially had to play by the rules set forward to 
them by the troika. Furthermore, the IMF was directly involved in the design of the country-
specific conditionality and monitoring of the program (ECB, September 2012). The program 
itself allowed the ECB to make purchases for European nation’s short-term bonds in the 
secondary market, with the aim of bringing down market interest rates faced by countries. The 
size of the program itself is unlimited and helped support the claim put forth by Mario Draghi 
that he would do whatever it takes to save the euro (Draghi, July 2012). With that being said, the 
program has yet to be used by any members of the Eurozone because of the fear of complying 
with either of the EFSM or EFSM policies. Another important caveat of the program is that it 
does not protect Italy, Spain or Portugal from any spillover effects from the crisis in Greece. A 
potential solution to the OMT program is the use of quantitative easing as an alternative 
monetary policy (this will be examined in the solutions sector of the chapter).   
Another example of a key policy put in place by the policy makers within the region was the new 
Fiscal Compact Treaty of 2013. As opposed to many of the previous policies discussed in this 
chapter that aimed to provide short-term support, the Fiscal Compact Treaty aimed to provide a 
long-term solution to the fiscal problems in the region. The main talking point of the treaty was 
that it required that new fiscal principles to be embedded in each country’s national legislation 
with the goal of reducing high public debt levels and maintaining a fiscal balance close to zero. 
One of the methods policy makers hoped to utilize in attempting to make this happen was by 
focusing on the structural budget balance of each nation (Lane, 2012). Policy makers thought 
that a structural budget balance, like the one that was implemented, would encourage 
governments to save cyclical revenue during periods of economic growth to help protect against 
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a greater slippage during recessions. To deal with the large amounts of public debt, nations will 
have to reduce public debt to below 60 percent of GDP (ECB, 2013).  
Still, this approach has faced many problems from the beginning including: measurement and 
surveillance issues. First off, it is challenging for forecasters to differentiate between cyclical and 
trend fluctuations in output. To deal with this inconsistency, governments must enact a 
mechanism that requires adjustments if the forecast errors for the structural budget balance 
continue to rise over several years (Lane, 2012). A second issue that arose was the hope of the 
policymakers that the fiscal discipline of each nation would be monitored at the domestic level. 
The belief was that each individual nation would monitor their fiscal balances since it would 
have greater political legitimacy than external surveillance by other EU organizations (Lane, 
2012). The problem with this objective is that it remains unclear if individual nations have the 
capacity and capability to identify excessive imbalances in an accurate manner or if they are able 
to deploy policy instruments to deal with these risk factors. 
Another major policy that the leaders of the EU chose to implement was the common areawide 
Eurobonds (Lane, 2012). These bonds were implemented with the goal of avoiding the 
disruptive impact of destabilizing speculative attacks on national sovereign debt markets within 
individual European nations. By introducing these bonds, policy makers hoped that member 
states would support them as they are cheaper than the alternatives for reducing default risks 
(larger bailout funds). Furthermore, countries who are facing serious debt payments would only 
have to pay the average and, lower, interest rate of all the euro members. The key to this is 
making sure that countries who are less financially stable do not over borrow. So far there have 
been relatively positive results, especially in the case of Greece where policy makers have been 
using Eurobonds to scrape together enough funds to meet repayment schedules.   
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However, this policy can be viewed as too little too late. As examined in the previous chapter, 
many nations faced major speculative attacks on their bonds as traders and investors were 
constantly looking for the next domino to fall. By examining the yield curves of these nation’s 
10Y government bonds we see the sharp rise in yields. This is backed anecdotally by an excerpt 
from an individual trader who discussed his ability to speculate on these bonds, thus causing 
their value to drop significantly (Weisbrot, 2015).  Although these Eurobonds have proved to be 
productive in diminishing speculative attacks and allowing countries to pay back their debt on 
time, they failed to help the nations deal with the initial attacks and rise in yields. 
The verdict is still out on whether or not the reforms put in place by the troika will lead to future 
economic stability in the nation. Although there have been some promising signs in Spain and 
Ireland, little improvement has been seen in Greece and Italy (it is important to remember that 
Italy represents a significant share of Euro GDP, as opposed to Greece). What is important to 
understand in the cases of Spain and Ireland is that they have begun to see relatively stable GDP 
growth. Furthermore, Spain has begun to reform their labor market and has seen recent 
improvements. One of the key things the Spanish government did was lower the corporate tax 
rate to make the nation more appealing to large corporations while also increasing FDI into the 
nation. 
4.3 Learning from other Crises 
It can be said that by examining the East Asian crisis of 1997 there are some important lessons 
that can be applied to the Eurozone crisis. After examining the crisis, it is clear that many of the 
nations had similar structural issues that related to their overall economic health. For example, 
when looking at the case of Indonesia, we see it was a country plagued by structural problems, 
corruption and an indecisive government (similar to that of Greece). The crises were also similar 
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in that in many of the cases the financial turmoil in the individual nations was characterized by 
an increase in the access to easy credit, a rise in overall debt, and a lack of supervision and 
regulation. In the case of the east Asian crisis, the governments in the region embarked on a 
restructuring of their domestic financial sector. This was done through shutting down non-viable 
financial institutions, increasing capital, and strengthening financial institutions that were 
deemed vital and selling off assets that were not of value in helping the recovery effort (Coeure, 
2013). On top of this, the governments of the East Asian nations that were affected by the crisis 
implemented further institutional and structural reforms. This was done through strengthened 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector along with further bank governance and market 
transparency.   
It is also important to examine the role that the IMF played in the crisis. However, in the case of 
the east Asian crisis it is clear that the IMF misunderstood many of the essential differences 
between the financial problems in these nations and those that they had dealt with in the past 
(they failed to originally grasp the idea that the crisis and stress on the financial sector had risen 
because of excessive short-term foreign borrowing by these nations private sectors). The fund 
was quick to realize that the solution they put forward regarding the role of budget surpluses and 
higher interest rates further compounded the crisis (Katz, 1999). Instead they placed a heavier 
emphasis on structural and institutional reforms rather than immediate crisis management 
measures. With that being said, it is clear that the IMF was not helpful in providing a long-term 
solution to the crisis in East Asia and much of the responsibilities fell on the domestic 
governments.  
However, there are some clear fundamental differences as to why the crises among the nations 
are fundamentally different and why the policy measures utilized in the East Asian crisis may not 
84 
 
be applicable to the European crisis. Unlike the case in Asia, the European countries are unable 
to devalue their currency as a way of creating economic growth through exports. The second 
difference in the crises is the role that the IMF played. In Asia, the IMF eased up their austerity 
measures in the region after severe criticism, while in Europe the Troika appears to be relentless 
up to this point. The result of this, as previously discussed, was domestic governments 
implementing their own recovering strategies, which in turn proved to be relatively successful.  
Another potential crisis that the policymakers of the troika should look at is the case of 
Argentina, which was able to emerge from their own crisis in 2001-2002 in a relatively robust 
manor. Furthermore, they also had a very strong export sector that was able to rely greatly on the 
nation’s vast and diverse natural resources. This reliance on exports coupled with the removal of 
the Argentinian peso from the peg to the U.S. dollar proved to be extremely important in leading 
the nation out of their crisis. As seen in the east Asia, the role of the IMF in no way helped 
improve the situation and instead the responsibility fell on the domestic government. In the years 
leading up to the crisis the IMF also made matters worse with its procyclical recommendations to 
domestic policymakers in these nations. 
There are many reasons why the policy measures established by the Argentinian government are 
so difficult to emulate in the case of the Eurozone. One of the key reasons being the fact that 
there was a political overhaul in the nation that led to a new government taking power and 
implementing their own economic policies. Argentina was also able to rely on its natural 
resource sector as a way of increasing exports following the devaluation of the peso. 
Furthermore, Argentina also chose to run a major deficit while playing hardball with its creditors 
especially those who were foreign and held the majority of the country’s debt (they reached a 
debt restructuring agreement in 2005). This is in sharp contrast to what is happening in European 
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nations right now where nations are running budget surpluses in order to satisfy their creditors 
demands. In the case of Argentina, strict foreign exchange controls were implemented during the 
beginning stages of the crisis. For example, exporters who had revenues greater than 1 million 
dollars, had to turn the excess to the central bank, while manufactures faced taxes on their 
exports (IMF, 2003) .  
In both of these individual cases, we witness the importance that the role of the domestic 
governments played in trying to provide both long term and immediate solutions in response to 
the crises they faced. Although the IMF tried to get their hands dirty and provide their 
‘resources’ to the nations involved, the funds’ involvement was not beneficial in providing 
immediate and long-term stability and growth in the case studies examined. This is something to 
keep in mind for the policymakers within each of the PIIGS nations. However, what may prove 
to be a challenge for these nations, is the fact they are not endowed with the same resources or 
exports and do not have the same ability to change their exchange rate to the overarching 
economic situation, as seen in the cases of Argentina and east Asia. The result of this is that 
many nations are being forced into accepting the policies and austerity measures sponsored by 
the IMF to the ECB and EMU, as seen in the years following the start of the Eurozone crisis.  
4.4 Potential Solutions and Criticisms  
There is no doubting or ignoring the severe criticisms surrounding many of the policies 
established by the troika. As previously mentioned, one of the most criticized policies are the 
austerity measures that were established. Although many economists agree that some extent of 
austerity was needed in Greece to be able to reduce the government’s deficit, these same 
measures were not needed for many of the other countries. In the case of Spain, the crisis arose 
from the banking sector and the nation was also running a surplus. In other words, Spain 
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shouldn’t have been forced to implement the measures put forward by the troika to have access 
to the bailout funds it needed. 
One idea that is perplexing about the measures established by the troika is the fact that the IMF 
has had a history of warning against the troubles associated with high taxation (specifically, the 
disincentive effect it has on the discouragement to work and save) (Stiglitz, 2016). However, in 
Greece the fund insisted on raising the effective tax rate to a level of 40 percent. Furthermore, 
they required all Greek firms to pay their taxes ahead of time at the start of the year. The goal of 
this was to reduce tax evasion, a problem that Greece has had to deal with for decades. This is a 
fair argument. What doesn’t seem to add up, however, is the belief that a country can grow its 
economy by paying taxes before they have even earned any money during that fiscal year. This 
policy clearly went against what most economists consider to be a good tax system, one that does 
not distort the economy any more than is necessary (Stiglitz, 2016).  
Another criticism of the policies put in place by the troika is the way they handled the banking 
crisis in Spain. As banks weakened in the country, they were forced to pay very high interest 
rates along with a decline in access to credit (these two things led the banks to become almost 
insolvent). This is supported by the fact that in 2013 approximately 9.4 percent of bank loans 
were nonperforming in comparison to total gross loans (IMF, 2013). Instead of focusing on 
implementing policies that would benefit the Spanish banks, policymakers within the troika were 
more concerned with saving the European banks that lent money to these countries in an effort to 
save the euro. What is even more telling is the fact that 60 percent of voters in Spain rejected the 
austerity measures implemented. The result of this was a political revolt, similar to which took 
place in Greece, calling for the breakup of long established national states and the rise of 
separatist parties.  
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Although the troika did try to implement structural reforms, it was clearly not enough. As the 
crisis continued it became clearer that there was a deep need for a complete overhaul of the 
European financial sector. The structural reforms implemented by the troika had the opposite 
effect of their intended purpose, long term economic growth. By looking at the case of Greece in 
the previous chapter we see that economic growth has been stagnant at best. Still, there are a 
number of potential solutions to these structural reforms that should be examined.  
One of the most important being a common banking union. This union would include common 
deposit insurance, common supervision and common resolution. For this union to be successful, 
there must be a focus on making sure that money does not flow from the banking system of weak 
countries to banks in strong countries through strong supervision and regulation (Stiglitz, 2016). 
Another important structural reform that should be examined by policymakers is the 
mutualization of debt. This has already been carried out through the creation of Eurobonds. The 
key to this is making sure that countries do not overborrow through this system. Furthermore, 
there should be increased incentive on creating a common framework for stability within the 
region. There are two questions that must be answered in regard to this: how to promote stability 
of the Eurozone as a whole and how to ensure that all of the countries in the region do well in the 
long run (Stiglitz, 2016). To do this a few key policy measures need to be implemented. The first 
is a common fiscal framework. This refers to the development of better budget rules through the 
creation of a capital budget. This capital budget should aim to distinguish between government 
spending on consumption goods from government spending on investment, while maintaining 
constraints on spending that relates to consumption (Stiglitz, 2016). Another important 
contribution to the development of a common fiscal framework would be the creation of a 
solidarity fund for stabilization. Because the crisis has engulfed the entire European region, the 
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creation of such a fund with the help of European wide resources would be greatly beneficial to 
the region. This fund would create a long-term solution to the underlying problems throughout 
the region as it would focus on funding unemployment insurance, support active labor market 
policies and other related social expenditures (Stiglitz, 2016).  
This proves to be a nice transition for what is arguably the most important structural reform that 
will have to take place: the reform of the labor market. From examining the cases of Italy and 
Greece there is little doubt, that for the policies that were put in place by the ECB to be effective, 
there has to be a fundamental change with regards to the labor sector in these nations. A specific 
focus should be placed on a structure that promotes not only full employment, but also solid, 
long-term economic growth. Although this may not be the fastest method of returning the 
countries to economic prosperity, it is one that must be put in place. One of the best examples of 
a nation that has already taken the initiative and adopted new labor reforms in an effort to change 
the structure within their domestic economy is Spain. However, this needs to take place on a 
wider scale and one of the best ways to make sure this happens is to change and expand the 
mandate of the ECB to promote full employment, growth, and economic expansion. Instead of 
solely worrying about economic indicators such as inflation levels, the ECB should increase their 
focus on making sure the financial sector is healthy and prosperous  
Furthermore, individual nations need to embark down a path to improve their overall labor 
markets. There have already been some distinct reforms set out by the troika as part of their 
austerity measures in the seventh austerity package presented to Greece in October of 2012. In 
the case of Greece and Italy, further emphasis needs to be placed on the idea of labor flexibility. 
These two countries can be highlighted because their labor forces are dominated by the role of 
unions. Although unions are not always the problem as they counter the power of monopolies 
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and oligopolies in certain markets, they contributed greatly to higher wages and generous 
unemployment benefits in these nations. Some of the ways to increase flexibility within these 
labor markets is through atypical employment arrangements, wage-setting decentralization (away 
from unions) and lowering unemployment benefits.  It is important to note that atypical 
employment refers to employment that does not conform to the standard or typical model of full-
time, regular employment with a single company or firm over an extended period. The problem 
associated with these measures is that they could also lead to adverse wage efficiency effects. 
Implementing these policies is obviously easier said than done as many of the nation’s labor 
markets were built on very different policies and beliefs. A region-wide solution may be difficult 
to not only monitor but also implement so that each nation shares the same benefits as one 
another.  
For nations seeking to implement structural labor market reform, an examination of the policies 
that Spain has utilized is critical. In 2012, the nation set forward a program to reform the nations 
labor market that focused on sector-wide bargaining, improved working conditions and 
decreasing severance payments for unfair dismissals. Although these policies may have been 
viewed as unpopular at the time due to austerity policies prompting worker dismissal, lowering 
severance payments encouraged workers to look for a job and not leave the labor market 
altogether. Specific policies included cutting lay-off payments from 42 months’ pay to 12 
months, working to create new jobs to decrease the structural unemployment rate, re-training 
workers so they can take advantage of new opportunities, and allowing for collective bargaining 
to take place across several industries.  
Another potential solution to the ongoing problems is for EU policy makers to try and develop a 
deeper level of a fiscal union. This would be done through allowing nations to share tax streams 
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or spending programs that would separate them from domestic output and GDP. On top of this, if 
the governments worked together to coordinate fiscal policies in relation to current 
macroeconomic conditions, the nations that were previously suffering would benefit from the 
advice of policy makers from other states. The issue that arises with this solution is that it is 
unlikely that many of the leaders in the countries that are economically stable would be willing 
to step up to the plate and support these nations. This is a valid argument as it is likely that their 
constituents do not want to pay for the mistakes of other countries. 
One of the most critical and controversial policies that has been used to help deal with the crisis 
is quantitative easing or QE. QE is a monetary policy tool that allows the ECB to create new 
electronic money in order to buy back government bonds in struggling nations to keep inflation 
at sustainable levels while also encouraging banks to pump money into the economy. The new 
money that has entered the economy through the creation of this electronic cash increases the 
size of bank reserves. The ideal outcome of this would be, as the bank’s reserves increased, more 
banks would make larger loans (they would buy new assets to replace the prior ones they sold to 
the central bank).  
Having said this, the jury is still out on the role of QE as a successful monetary policy. One of 
the main reasons for this is the belief that QE leads to reckless financial behavior and provides 
money to a number of countries that are unable to manage the cash in a way that will lead to long 
term economic growth.  
It is evident that the troika understands the fact that there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach in 
addressing each of the individual countries. Although each one is fundamentally related to 
sovereign debt, their causes are all different and thus require unique strategies. One of the issues 
that will no doubt be weighing on the minds of policy makers in each of the countries being 
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examined is the elevated levels of public debt. In order to pay off this debt, there needs to be an 
increase in economic growth within each nation. The best way to do this in a way that is not 
artificial is through labor market reforms and tighter fiscal policies (it is important to point out 
that by introducing tighter fiscal policies this may induce a downward multiplier effect). As labor 
markets are reformed and productivity and efficiency increases, the ability to start raising money 
through fiscal policies (such as tax revenue) will start becoming a factor, however it can do so 
only after a substantial lag in months and year. This is obviously easier said than done, as many 
of these countries have been operating in labor markets that have not been reformed for decades.  
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Conclusion 
From the case studies in the individual nations of the Eurozone and Argentina, it is clear that the 
underlying cause of the sovereign debt crises in these countries are not due to the roles of foreign 
financial institutions. Rather, it is clear that each of the economies had underlying issues and 
weaknesses that were at the heart of each crisis. In the case of the Eurozone, many of these 
weaknesses and instabilities were present in these nations’ economies for decades prior to the 
initial crash. All that was needed to exploit them was for the first domino to fall. What is 
interesting is the fact that those responsible for allowing these nations to adopt the euro as a 
common currency failed to recognize these structural weaknesses. This negligence coupled with 
the fact the EU was established for political, not economic reasons, and did not have the 
necessary institutions and tools in-place to succeed, set the region up for disaster if one of its 
nations were to fail. 
It is important not to discount the role of the U.S. financial crisis in exasperating the crises that 
unfolded in Europe. Although the Great Recession of 2007 – 2009 was not examined in depth, as 
it was not a sovereign debt crisis, it played a major role in the health of these nations in the 
Eurozone and their ability to recover. This was especially the case for Spain, Ireland, and 
Portugal who relied greatly on short-term global debt markets to help finance many of the 
government and private sector projects in each country.  
As discussed in the thesis it becomes evident that the policies implemented by the IMF did 
nothing but accelerate and deepen the crises. In the case of East Asian nations, it would have 
been best for the nations to have implemented their own domestic policies and to not have relied 
as heavily on the IMF for assistance. For example, when examining the case of Argentina, 
although they relied on the IMF for help in the initial response to their crisis, the role and 
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policies promoted by domestic policymakers was what eventually led the nation down a path of 
long-term economic growth.  
That being said, Argentina was an exceptional case in that it was able to float its exchange rate 
while also being able to utilize its strong export sector, as they were heavily endowed with vast 
natural resources. In the case of the Eurozone, many of the nations are less fortunate in that they 
do not share the same ability to rely on their commodity sector to spur domestic economic 
growth. Instead, they have been faced with the task of not only relying on the ECB and EMU for 
guidance, but also having to try and find alternative ways to generate long-term growth through 
structural reforms. As discussed, these reforms are not only limited to reducing the overall level 
of debt, but also towards improving the flexibility of the labor market in each nation. Although 
these reforms may not be the quick-fix solution that many domestic policymakers and politicians 
are hoping for, they are necessary for providing a long-term solution to the region’s problems. 
This thesis opens the door for further research to be examined by future students and economists 
who are interested in the topic of sovereign debt crises. One of the ways for this to be done is to 
place a focus on the role of institutions in each of the case studies being examined. In other 
words, now that it is clearer that the leading cause for these crises was underlying structural and 
fundamental economic weaknesses, a focus can be placed on solely looking at the role of 
financial institutions and how they have impacted the recovery of these nations. Another 
interesting and potential course of study to follow up on would be to examine, in more detail, the 
movement of government bonds and the movement of their yield curves in the months leading 
up to the crisis and years following it. If this were to be done, a specific emphasis should be 
placed on determining if there is any pattern between the institutions and traders that hold the 
bonds and the way they were traded.  
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